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Credit Rating Changes’ Impact on Banks: 
Evidence from the US Banking Industry 
 
 
Abstract: This study examines the impact of credit rating upgrades and downgrades on six 
comprehensive banks’ asset classes, profitability, leverage and size using data from the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation’s call reports and Bloomberg over the period 1989-2008. In 
summary, the results suggest that a downgrade has a lasting and relatively more severe impact on 
banks than an upgrade; however, downgraded banks do not seem to effectively reduce their 
appetite for risk over a longer horizon. It seems that the role of credit rating agencies as an integral 
part of banks’ prudential supervision through market discipline is, in a longer horizon, overstated. 
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Credit Rating Changes’ Impact on Banks: 
Evidence from the US Banking Industry 
 
 
1. Introduction. 
In this paper we examine, to our knowledge for the first time in the literature, credit ratings 
changes’ impact on banks. This subject is of great importance because of the emphasis on credit 
ratings role in bank prudential supervision. Thus, this paper aims to shed some light on the 
effectiveness of the employment of credit rating agencies on banks’ regulatory and supervisory 
scheme. In particular, the study investigates the impact of upgrades and downgrades on six 
comprehensive banks’ asset classes, profitability, leverage and size in one and two years’ horizon 
after the credit rating change. For this, we use a novel dataset with data from the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation’s (FDIC) annual call reports and changes in the S&P long term issuer 
credit rating with data from Bloomberg for the 1989-2008 period. As in Kang and Liu (2009), the 
difference-in-differences econometric approach, properly modified to take into account Bertrand 
et al.’s (2004) critique is implemented. The basic model is estimated using Heckman’s two-step 
estimation method along with robustness checks based on an OLS approach that addresses the 
endogeneity and sample selection bias issues.  
The main objective of banks is the processing of risk and information (Greenbaum and 
Thakor, 2007). The uniqueness of their business and essential role they play for the economy 
underscore the importance of monitoring their risks and supervise their behavior. Other 
intermediaries, such as credit rating agencies help resolving, at least in part, the problem of 
asymmetric information that plagues lending relationships. The rationale for credit ratings is based 
on the achievement of economies of scale in information production about credit risk and in the 
attempt to solve agency problems (e.g., Gonzalez et al., 2004). This attempt yields the outcome of 
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the extensive employment of ratings in asset management rules, as well as in banks’ supervision 
and government regulations on financial institutions (Tang, 2009).  
In the Basel II Capital Accord emphasis is placed on credit ratings and market discipline – 
one of the three pillars on which bank prudential supervision is based. This pillar is designed to 
employ market participants as disciplinary devices through increased disclosure and transparency. 
Market discipline incorporates two distinct notions: market monitoring and market influence 
(Bliss and Flannery, 2002). The first refers to the investors’ ability to evaluate a bank’s true value, 
while the second examines how market price changes affect managers’ actions to offset adverse 
changes in the bank’s condition.  
Apart from market discipline however, banks also face regulatory discipline (Billett et al. 
1998). As Berger et al. (2000) point out, credit rating agencies and bank supervisors have similar 
incentives, as they are both concerned with default risk, and provide evidence that information 
produced by one of these two groups is subsequently incorporated into the other’s assessment. 
Thus, the impact of credit rating changes on banks may stem from their role as corporate device 
mechanisms as in the case of non-financial firms (Kisgen, 2006; Tang, 2009). Or, it could be the 
joint outcome of both market discipline triggered by a credit rating change and regulatory 
discipline – at least for downgraded banks, given the complement role supervisors and market 
participants have in the governance of financial institutions (Berger et al., 2000).  
Thus, to test whether the employment of credit rating agencies on this governance scheme 
is adequately effective, one should isolate the impact of credit rating changes on banks from the 
contemporaneous effect of possible regulatory actions, we examine whether the banks in our 
sample that received a rating change faced also an enforcement action adopted by US banking 
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supervisory authorities. We do so in this paper using data on bank enforcement actions from the 
FDIC, OCC and FRB for the period examined.  
Our results show that in the one year horizon after a rating change an upgrade results in an 
increase in net loans and profitability. A downgrade, however, results in an increase in loss 
allowance and other real estate owned, providing evidence for an effort of downgraded banks to 
reduce their loan portfolio risk and cleanse bad loans. Turning to the two-year horizon, upgraded 
banks continue to exhibit higher profitability and increase in size, while downgraded banks 
continue to increase their loss provisions, while they improve their liquidity position. Surprisingly 
though, there is evidence for an increase in their leverage and size. In summary, the findings 
suggest that a downgrade has a lasting and relatively more severe impact on banks than an 
upgrade; yet, downgraded banks seem to not effectively reduce their appetite for risk in a longer 
horizon.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a brief review of the 
literature on the market discipline of banks and on the role of credit ratings. Section 3 describes 
the data with the econometric methodology presented in Section 4. Section 5 discusses the 
empirical results. Concluding remarks are given in Section 6. 
 
 
2. Brief Literature Review. 
2.1. Market discipline on banks 
There is a relatively large empirical literature on the market discipline on banks. The literature 
focuses on the market monitoring component on banks’ risks, providing mixed evidence on its 
effectiveness. For example, in the light of the recent financial turmoil, a possible systematic 
market failure in such a monitoring was put forth as a possible explanation (Flannery, 2008). On 
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the contrary, Palvia and Patro (2010) provide evidence that markets can indeed monitor banks 
effectively, reinforcing the role of market discipline as a supervisory mechanism. However, when 
it comes to market influence on banks’ decisions, to the best of our knowledge, only Bliss and 
Flannery (2002) specifically examine the issue. They employ a large set of managerial action 
variables and stock and bond returns for the period 1986-1998 to investigate the role of market 
participants on the governance of bank holding companies. Their results do not provide strong 
evidence that stock or bond investors regularly touch upon managerial actions, although they find 
patterns consistent with market influence. Nevertheless, as Rajan (2001) argues, the result of 
market influence is hard to identify empirically. 
Opaqueness, an inherent characteristic of banks, may alter market discipline and justifies 
bank regulation to mitigate the difficulty of bank assets’ valuation. Conceptually, opaqueness is 
based on information asymmetry and is closely related to Knightian uncertainty more than to risk 
(Morgan, 2002). Incompletely disclosed information, the uncertain quality and credibility of the 
disclosures, as well as the inherent complexity of the banking business and/or the ability of 
managers to rapidly transform assets may result in imprecise knowledge by the investors about the 
underlying profitability and risks of the firm (Myers and Rajan, 1998). 
2.2. The Role of the Credit Ratings 
The role of credit rating agencies has increased considerably during recent years. However, there 
is an unsettled debate about credit ratings’ impact and importance in the literature. On the positive 
side, Graham and Harvey (2001) show that credit ratings are more important in affecting a firm’s 
funding policy than factors suggested by capital structure theories. Along this front, Faulkender 
and Petersen (2006) reveal that firms which issue rated bonds are more leveraged. Kisgen (2006, 
2009) finds that firms close to a rating upgrade or downgrade issue less debt than equity, relative 
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to firms without a rating change. Tang (2009) also documents that credit ratings significantly 
affect firms’ access to credit markets. Others, however, question the importance of credit ratings 
as providers of information. For example, Brealey and Myers (2003) argue that credit rating 
agencies reflect as much about market participants’ opinion about a firm’s financial condition as 
providing new information.  
The consequences of rating changes on the valuation of stock and bonds have been 
extensively examined. For example, Hand et al. (1992) show that only rating downgrades have a 
negative impact on stock and bond prices, while upgrades’ information is incorporated into prices 
prior to announcement. Ederington and Goh (1998) reveal that downgrades cause negative equity 
returns and analysts’ earning forecast revisions. Brooks et al. (2004) confirm that rating changes 
have the same impact on countries’ market returns as in the case of firms. Jorion et al. (2005) 
explore the effect of the Fair Disclosure (FD) Regulation in the US, which prohibited the 
selective, non-public disclosure of information by firms to favored investment analysts excluding 
credit rating agencies, to find that the informational effect on stock prices of downgrades and 
upgrades is much larger in the post-FD period.   
In an effort to tie together the empirical findings, as well as to provide a comprehensive 
explanation for the increased role of credit ratings, Boot et al. (2006) develop a theoretical model 
to show that credit ratings coordinate investors’ beliefs. As they argue, credit ratings have a real 
value and impact through their monitoring role, especially in the credit watch procedure, and the 
significance of the ratings for institutional investors’ decisions. However, Boot et al. (2006) point 
out that market participants’ increased reliance on credit rating agencies might discourage other 
monitoring mechanisms and fuel an excessive dependence on them.  
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More recently, Kuang and Qin (2009) document the role and significance of credit ratings 
on firms’ managerial actions to find that credit ratings act as delegated monitors and deter 
managers’ risk taking incentives. In accordance with this finding, Kang and Liu (2009) provide 
evidence on the positive impact of rating changes on managers’ incentives. They show that credit 
ratings play a disciplinary role on managers’ actions and help reduce agency conflicts, in 
combination with other corporate governance mechanisms.   
  
3. Data Description. 
 
Data comes from Bloomberg and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s call reports. 
Bloomberg provides data for commercial banks’ and bank holding companies’ credit ratings. The 
call reports provide financial data for all commercial banks and bank holding companies that are 
regulated by the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the 
Comptroller of the Currency.  
The Standard and Poor’s long term issuer credit rating, for which data is available for 370 
financial entities over the period 1987-2009 is used. This initial credit rating sample includes 
4,043 firm-year observations. We convert the letter long term issuer credit rating at the end of 
each year to a numerical scale as AAA=1, AA+=2,…, D=22, thus higher numbers correspond to 
lower ratings. The 370 financial entities contained in the initial credit rating sample are then 
matched with those included in the annual call reports. This matching process yields 295 entities, 
from which 201 are commercial banks and 94 bank holding companies.  
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From the annual call reports data ten financial account variables are calculated denoted as 
X1 to X10 for each banking firm.1 Table 1 presents the financial account variables employed in the 
analysis.   
Insert Table 1 here 
 As Table 1 documents, six of the financial account variables measure the asset 
composition of each bank at the end of each year. X1 refers to net loans; X2 to loan loss allowance, 
a variable indicative of the quality of each banking firm’s loan portfolio; X3 to trading assets, 
which proxies for the size of its trading portfolio; while X4 refers to other real estate owned which 
measures real estate taken in settlement of problem loans plus real estate investments, other than 
bank premises. X5 refers to the sum of bank’s premises and fixed assets, investments in 
unconsolidated subsidiaries and intangible assets. This variable measures the more opaque assets, 
i.e., assets that investors cannot value very accurately (Flannery et al., 2004). X6 refers to the more 
transparent assets, i.e., assets that are more easily valued, and includes the sum of cash and 
balances due, total investment securities, interbank balances, and federal funds sold and securities 
purchased under agreement to resell.  
The remaining four variables pertain to banks’ profitability, leverage and size. More 
specifically, X7 and X8 refer to net income and total non-interest income. These two profitability 
measures could be viewed as not so discretionary as the other financial account variables 
employed in the analysis; however it is important in our opinion to examine the impact of rating 
changes on banks’ profitability. All the above variables are scaled with total assets. Due to this 
scaling, the difference in economic size of the banking firms in the sample does not drive the 
results, nor does it affect their interpretation. Finally, X9 measures total liabilities scaled by the 
book value of equity; and X10 is the log of total assets. Surely, a change in some of these variables 
                                                 
1 Adapted from Flannery et al. (2004) 
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may not be a direct result of bank managerial actions after a credit rating change, but rather a 
reflection of the deteriorating/improving performance of the bank related indirectly to a rating 
change.  
The call reports sample contains 6,019 firm-year observations on the ten financial account 
variables used, from which 4,154 pertain to commercial banks and the remaining 1,865 on bank 
holding companies. Finally, the two samples, the initial credit rating sample and the call reports 
sample are merged. This merged sample includes 2,895 firm-year observations for which both 
financial and credit ratings data are available with 1,848 observations on commercial banks and 
1,047 on bank holding companies.  
To examine the impact of credit rating changes on banks’ financial account variables the 
difference-in-differences (henceforth, DD) technique following Kang and Liu (2009) is employed. 
Each bank that has a rating that changed at year t, relative to its value at t-1, is defined as a 
‘treated’ bank. Hence, the event date for the ‘treatment’ as t is identified. Then, for every ‘treated’ 
bank in the sample all ‘untreated’ banks are identified that satisfy the following three criteria, in 
order to properly function as candidate controls for the ‘treated’ bank: (1) the ‘untreated’ bank 
must have the same rating as the ‘treated’ bank at t-1, i.e., one year before the event date; (2) its 
rating remained unchanged for one year after t, i.e., until t+1; and (3) for each ‘treated’ 
commercial bank – or bank holding company, a commercial bank – or bank holding company, 
respectively, that satisfy the criteria 1) and 2) is distinguished as candidate control. This procedure 
identifies several ‘untreated’ banks that could serve as controls for each ‘treated’ bank. Then, for 
every financial account variable for each ‘treated’ bank, we calculate the average value of the 
respective variable for all available control banks, i.e., we construct an ‘average’ control bank for 
each ‘treated’ bank. For each bank, both ‘treated’ and control, the changes for the X1 to X10 
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variables for the t-1 to t+1 period, defined as DDX1 to DDX10 are calculated. These variables are 
the focus of the examination of the changes in banks’ asset composition, profitability, leverage 
and size after a credit rating change. To facilitate the econometric analysis, the respective changes 
for the t-1 to t period, denoted as DXi, i =1,.., 10, as well as the value of each variable at t-1, 
denoted as Xilag1,  i =1,.., 10 are also employed. 
The final working dataset contains 289 pairs of firm-year observations matched with their 
controls which cover the 1989-2008 period. However, a symmetric impact of a credit rating 
upgrade or downgrade on banks’ decision making and performance is a rather strong assumption. 
Credit rating agencies evaluate bank’s financial condition on behalf of its debt-holders, and thus, 
an upgrade is highly unlikely to impact banks in an analogous way as a downgrade. Furthermore, 
credit rating changes cause different reactions in money and capital markets, e.g., a decrease 
(increase) of a bank’s risk premium in the case of an upgrade (downgrade), which, in turn, is more 
likely to impact the bank’s asset-liability management and profitability unevenly. Thus, the 
analysis is performed separately to the two samples of upgraded and downgraded banks matched 
with their controls. The results confirm the highly heterogeneous impact of a credit rating change 
on upgraded and downgraded banks’ decision making and performance. Hence, the final working 
dataset is split to construct two samples: one containing 158 pairs of firm-year observations for 
upgraded banks, and one containing 131 pairs for downgraded banks.  
Furthermore, to mitigate concerns about the contemporaneous effect of possible regulatory 
actions, i.e., the regulatory discipline effect, we examined whether the banks in our final working 
dataset faced also an enforcement action adopted by the FDIC, OCC and FRB for the period 
examined. This examination yielded only 10 banks with an enforcement action imposed within 2 
years after the rating change: 5 of them concerned upgraded banks and 5 downgraded ones. We 
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included these banks for concerns about degrees of freedom and since they represent a very small 
fraction of the sample size. However, the results remained the same when we excluded these 
banks from the analysis.  
 
3.1. Descriptive Statistics. 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the S&P long term issuer credit rating in Panel A, and 
rating changes in Panels B and C, respectively. The first row in each panel shows the period 
examined, subsumed into two to four years periods for the sake of brevity, while the first column 
lists the letter S&P long term issuer credit rating in Panel A, and the credit rating changes in 
Panels B and C. In Panel A each cell reports two numbers separated by a slash: the first 
corresponds to the number of observations in the initial credit rating sample obtained from 
Bloomberg, while the second to the number of observations in the merged sample with data from 
the call reports.  
Insert Table 2 here 
As Panel A documents, the vast majority of banks rated by S&P over the 1987-2009 period has a 
long term issuer credit rating that ranges from AA (209 banks) to BBB- (120 banks). Very few 
banks are in the top or the bottom of the rating ladder (18 banks rated as AAA, 9 banks rated 
below CCC+). More importantly, as it is apparent from the final column in Panel A, the 
distributional characteristics of the credit rating for the merged sample are quite similar with those 
of the initial sample obtained from Bloomberg. Hence, the merged sample captures adequately the 
population characteristics with respect to the credit rating employed.  
In Panels B and C each cell reports the number of credit rating changes, i.e., upgrades, 
downgrades and total changes, in the initial credit rating sample, along with the relevant number 
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of available observations in the final working dataset after the slash. The final row in each panel 
reports the total number of firm-year observations for which there were no credit rating change. 
The period covered starts at 1989 because of the need for the lagged values of the financial 
account variables for the analysis, and ends at 2008. Thus, 560 out of 3,450 firm-year 
observations of the initial credit rating sample for the 1989-2008 period correspond to credit rating 
changes, while for the remaining 2,890 there was no change. Out of the 560 cases of credit rating 
change, 289, i.e., about 51.6% of the total, are included in the final working dataset which, as the 
last column in Panel C indicates, has the same distributional characteristics as that of the credit 
rating changes in notches that occurred in the US banking industry during this period. 
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the changes in the financial account variables of 
upgraded and downgraded banks over the t-1 to t+1 and t-1 to t periods, with t being the year of 
the credit rating change. The first column lists the variables, while the next two couples of 
columns report the mean and standard deviation of these variables for upgraded and downgraded 
banks, respectively. The last two columns report the difference between the means for these two 
groups of banks for each variable and the respective t-statistics. 
Insert Table 3 here 
As this table indicates, upgraded banks are significantly different from downgraded banks 
over both the t-1 to t+1 and t-1 to t periods with respect to the majority of the financial account 
variables examined. Specifically, over the t-1 to t+1 period the difference between the means of 
the change in net loans (DDX1); loan loss allowance (DDX2); other real estate owned (DDX4); the 
sum of banks’ premises and fixed assets (DDX5); more transparent assets (DDX6) and the log of 
total assets (DDX10) are all significant at least at the 5% level. Only the mean difference in the 
change in trading assets (DDX3) is significant at the 10% level, while there is no statistically 
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significant difference for the change in net income (DDX7), non-interest income (DDX8) and 
leverage (DDX9). A similar picture arises for the t-1 to t period, where only the difference between 
the means for upgraded and downgraded banks of the change in net loans (DX1), non-interest 
income (DX8) and leverage (DX9) are insignificant. 
 
4. Econometric Issues. 
 
As already mentioned, to explore the impact of credit rating changes on banks’ asset composition, 
profitability, leverage and size, the DD estimation method is employed. This method is widely 
used as a tool to examine the causal effect of a ‘treatment’ event, usually measured by a dummy 
variable, on a variable of interest that accounts for the characteristics and/or the behavior of the 
‘treated’ group, i.e., the group that is exposed to this event. For this, the change in the variable of 
interest before and after the event for the ‘treated’ group is compared to the change of the same 
variable for an ‘untreated’ or control group over the same period. The main econometric issue 
with the DD estimation method is the omitted variable bias, or selection bias, which stems from 
the possible heterogeneity between the ‘treated’ and control group for reasons other than the 
‘treatment’ event. This bias is possibly present in the case of non-experimental, or observational 
data. Econometric techniques, such as instrumental variables regression, are routinely used to deal 
with the problem of missing or unknown controls. The DD estimation method has several 
appealing characteristics, such as simplicity and the potential to deal with endogeneity issues, and 
flexibility to be used in a panel or repeated cross-section regression framework with group and 
time fixed effects, where the time dimension of the panel usually covers several periods.   
However, as Bertrand et al. (2004) point out, in a panel regression framework where 
multiple observations are used in the time dimension for the event variable, the significance of the 
change is overstated due to the presence of serial correlation and the inconsistency of the resulting 
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standard error of the estimate associated with the event effect. This correlation problem is inherent 
in the construction of the event variable, which consists of a series of zeros for the pre-event 
period, followed by a series of one. To bypass the serial correlation problem, Bertrand et al. 
(2004) suggest the use of a single observation in the post-event period t+1, instead of multi-year 
post-treatment observations, and focusing on the average change in the variable of interest for this 
observation at t+1 relative to the benchmark year t-1. Furthermore, the endogeneity of the credit 
rating change variable could be a serious problem which is not easily tackled in the usually 
employed panel regression framework. 
 Following Bertrand et al.’s (2004) suggestions, we employ the changes for the variables of 
interest at t+1 relative to their values at t-1 for the ‘treated’ and control banks. The omitted 
variable bias is dealt with by calculating an ‘average’ control bank for each ‘treated’ bank, as 
mentioned in the previous section. Because there are many factors that could affect a bank’s asset 
composition, as well as its profitability, leverage and size, the changes in X1 to X10 variables 
lagged once, i.e., for the period from t-2 to t, defined as DDXilag1, for i=1,…,10, are used as 
covariates. The inclusion in the model of the change in the dependent variable for the t-1 to t 
period, DXi, and its’ value at t-1, Xilag1, as well as of variables other than the dependent variable 
at t-1, i.e., Xjlag1 for ,ij ≠  in some cases, is also suggested by the Ramsey’s RESET specification 
test and the Schwartz and Akaike information criteria. To save space, the results of these tests are 
not reported but are available upon request. Thus, the basic model for the one year horizon after 
the rating change is formulated as:  
 i
ij
jjiiii
k
kkiii ulagXlagXDXlagDDXCRDUMDDX ++++++= ∑∑
≠=
111
10
1
ζεδγβα  (1) 
where k takes the values from 1 to 10, spanning the ten financial account variables examined. 
CRDUM is a dummy variable that takes the values of 1 and 0 for the ‘treated’ and control banks, 
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respectively.2 The focus is on the sign and significance of the estimated parameter .iβ  A positive 
(negative) and significant .iβ  indicates an increase (decrease) of the relevant variable of interest 
for the ‘treated’ group relative to the control group. To mitigate the effect of possible outliers on 
the estimated coefficients of interest, a trimming procedure on the 99.7% confidence interval, i.e., 
removal of the outliers that lie outside three standard deviations from the mean, is performed for 
the two samples of upgraded and downgraded banks with respect to all variables employed.  
Formulated in this way, the above basic model adequately captures the complex dynamics 
among banks’ different asset classes, profitability and leverage; hence, it abstracts from the need 
of explicitly modeling the banks’ decision making and ever-changing environment. More 
importantly, the changes specification in equation (1) cancels out any fixed bank-specific effects 
that could drive the results. Furthermore, equation (1), together with the structure of the dataset of 
matched pairs of ‘treated’ and control banks, allows for time-invariant unobservable differences 
between them.  
 To further address the potential selection bias problem and the endogeneity of the CRDUM 
variable, the above model is estimated using Heckman’s two-step estimation method in the two 
samples of upgraded and downgraded banks. The cluster robust standard errors method is used to 
deal with heteroskedasticity problems. Thus, in the first stage regression, CRDUM is estimated 
using the following probit model: 
 )(), 1Pr( ββ XXCRDUM ′Φ==   (2) 
where X is a vector containing the explanatory variables employed in equation (1) and a set of 
instruments, Z, that are correlated with CRDUM and uncorrelated with the disturbance term in 
                                                 
2 With this approach, we do not account for the possible nonlinear effect of the credit rating level of the ‘treated’ bank 
before a rating change occurs. In other words, a downgrade from AA+ to A, for example, may not be as relevant as a 
downgrade from BBB to BBB-. Instead, we obtain estimates of the mean impact of a rating change on the dependent 
variable across the rating ladder.  
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equation (1). Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. The set of instruments 
includes seven variables: the change of the log assets from t-1 to t, DX10; loss allowance to total 
assets at t-1, X2lag1; the sum of bank’s premises and fixed assets, investments in unconsolidated 
subsidiaries and intangible assets to total assets at t-1, X5lag1;  the sum of cash and balances due, 
total investment securities, interbank balances, and federal funds sold and securities purchased 
under agreement to resell to total assets at t-1, X6lag1; net income to total assets at t-1, X7lag1; log 
assets at t-1, X10lag1; and S&P’s long term issuer credit rating at t-1, CRlag1.  
The rationale for the use of these instrumental variables can be traced to their intuitive 
relationship with a credit rating change. Specifically, the change in the (log) of total assets, DX10, 
and the level of this variable at t-1, X10lag, proxy for the risk-taking behavior of banks (Flannery 
and Nikolova, 2004), as well as for bank’s portfolio diversification capabilities, economies of 
scale and scope and access to capital markets. Loan loss allowance to total assets at t-1, X2lag1 
provides a proxy for the credit quality of a bank’s loan portfolio. The sum of bank’s premises and 
fixed assets, investments in unconsolidated subsidiaries and intangible assets to total assets at t-1, 
X5lag1, and the sum of cash and balances due, total investment securities, interbank balances, and 
federal funds sold and securities purchased under agreement to resell to total assets at t-1, X6lag1, 
proxy for the ability to absorb potential losses in their portfolios and for their level of liquidity. 
Finally, net income to total assets at t-1, X7lag1, is a measure of the capability of a bank’s asset 
portfolio to generate profits and thus, of its quality, while the lagged value of the bank’s long term 
issuer credit rating is a proxy for the bank’s overall credit quality and is expected to have a 
positive relationship with the probability of downgrade. Here, it must be stressed that the same set 
of these seven instruments is employed in equation (2) for both samples of upgraded and 
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downgraded banks along with their controls. In other words, the same variables are used for the 
modeling the probability of an upgrade or a downgrade relatively to no rating change. 
The correct econometric specification of the model in equation (2) is tested by the use of 
the likelihood ratio and the Hosmer–Lemeshow goodness-of-fit tests. The Hosmer–Lemeshow 
statistic must fail to reject the null for the model to have an acceptable match between predicted 
and observed probabilities. Again, to save space, the results of these tests are not reported here but 
are available upon request.  
To gain confidence with respect to the results, the analysis is repeated by employing the 
two stage least squares (TSLS) estimation technique in the above model. Specifically, the first 
stage regression (2) is estimated with OLS, i.e., a linear probability model is employed for the 
CRDUM variable. The over-identifying restrictions test, which fails to reject the null at the 5% 
confidence level for all 10 dependent variables, is performed which yields essentially the same 
results. To economize on space, these results are available upon request. 
 
4.1. An OLS approach. 
As an additional robustness check, following Kang and Liu’s (2009) approach, the impact of 
credit rating changes on banks’ characteristics is examined using a model which abstracts from the 
need of instruments for the estimation. Specifically, the dataset is restructured by splitting each 
variable employed to form two distinct series: one comprising of the values for the ‘treated’ banks 
and one for their controls. Then the following model is estimated with OLS: 
 i
ij
jjiiii
k
kkiiii ulagXXlagDXlagDDXCNTRDDXDDX ++++++= ∑∑
≠=
111
10
1
ζεδγβα  (3) 
where CNTRDDXi is the change in the variable of interest for the control banks and DDXi is the 
relevant change for the ‘treated’ banks. Here, the coefficient of interest is .iα  The inclusion of the 
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CNTRDDXi  variable in the above equation takes into account factors that may affect the ‘treated’ 
bank’s decisions and performance, irrespective of its rating change.   
 
4.2. Impact on Two Years Horizon. 
The impact of credit rating change on upgraded and downgraded banks is further examined in a 
two year horizon after the change. Thus, the variable denoted as DDXiav2, i=1,..,10 is calculated 
as the average value of the respective Xi variable at t+1 and t+2, minus its value at t-1, as in Kang 
and Liu (2009). Due to missing data at t+2 for some banks, these longer horizon samples include 
126 pairs that refer to upgraded banks matched with their controls and 94 pairs to downgraded 
banks. DDXiav2 is used as the dependent variable, while the covariates DDXiav2lag1, i=1,.., 10 
are defined as the average value of the respective Xi variable at t+1 and t, minus its value at t-2. 
The Ramsey’s RESET specification test and the Schwartz and Akaike information criteria are 
performed yielding the basic model as follows: 
 i
ij
jjii
k
kkiii lagXDDXlagavDDXCRDUMavDDX εζδγβα +++++= ∑∑
≠=
1122
10
1
 (4) 
The Heckman two-step estimation method is undertaken in equation (4), as well as the TSLS 
method described above for robustness check, while the relevant model in the OLS approach has 
the form:  
 i
ij
jjii
k
kkiiii ulagXDDXlagavDDXavCNTRDDXavDDX +++++= ∑∑
≠=
11222
10
1
ζδγβα  (5) 
 
5. Results.  
The results are reported in Tables 4 to 11. All tables have the same structure. The first row shows 
the dependent variables, i.e., the ten financial account variables examined, while the other rows 
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report the estimated coefficients (standard errors in parentheses) of the explanatory variables, the 
number of observations and the Wald statistic or the adjusted R2 for the two methods employed, 
respectively. The last two rows in Tables 4, 6, 8 and 10 report the pseudo-R2 and the likelihood 
ratio statistics from the first stage regression estimated from equation (2). The coefficients of 
interest are highlighted in grey.  
To make sense of the huge amount of information generated by the empirical analysis, the 
focus is on the following issues: First, the financial account variables for upgraded and 
downgraded banks for which the coefficients of interest, i.e., the coefficient of the CRDUM 
variable in equation (1) and the intercept in equation (3) are significant, as well as their sign. 
Second, whether the financial account variables that are significant in the one-year horizon are the 
same with those in the two-year horizon, i.e., whether a rating change has a lasting impact on 
banks.  
  Summarizing the main results, there is a statistically significant increase in net loans and 
profitability in the one year horizon after the rating change for upgraded banks relative to their 
control banks for which there is no rating change. These findings are confirmed for both models 
employed, while there is weak evidence of a decrease in loss allowance to total assets. Indeed, the 
results from equation (1) indicate that the coefficient of CRDUM for the DDX2 dependent variable 
is negative and significant, while the intercept is insignificant in equation (3) for the relevant 
variable. However, for downgraded banks all estimation approaches indicate that loss allowance 
and other real estate owned are both significant and positive in the one year horizon after the 
rating change. These findings show that in the short term, downgraded banks make an effort to 
reduce their loan portfolio risk and cleanse bad loans.  
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Turning to the two-year horizon after a rating change, upgraded banks continue to perform 
better than their controls since they exhibit higher profitability, while the coefficient for net loans 
is no longer significant. Furthermore, upgraded banks increase in size, since the coefficients of 
interest for the DDX10 variable in both models is highly significant and positive. However, for 
downgraded banks the results reveal a more complex story. On the one hand, there is an effort to 
improve their financial condition: they continue to increase their loss provisions relatively to their 
controls, while at the same time their liquidity position improves, as indicated by the positive and 
significant coefficient of interest for the DDX6 variable. Also, the results provide weak evidence 
of an increase in their profitability. More interestingly, the relevant coefficients of interest for the 
leverage ratio and total assets are positive and significant, indicating an increase in their leverage 
and size relative to their pairs.  
More details follow. 
 
Upgraded Banks – One Year Horizon. 
As Table 4 documents, for the change in net loans to total assets, DDX1, the CRDUM variable is 
positive and significant at the 10% level. This indicates that upgraded banks expand net credit 
more than their controls. Other significant explanatory variables are the change in net loans for the 
t-1 to t period, DX1, and the level of net loans at t-1, X1lag1, with a positive and negative sign, 
respectively. Additionally, the change from t-2 to t in log assets, DDX10lag1 and the values at t-1 
of X5 and X10 which measure fixed assets and subsidiaries and the size of banks are significant, all 
with negative sign. The Wald statistic is 391.94 and highly significant, while the statistics for the 
first stage regression indicate that the instruments employed for the CRDUM variable are 
satisfactory. 
Insert Table 4 here 
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For the change in loss allowance to total assets, DDX2, the coefficient of CRDUM is negative and 
significant at the 1% level. This result indicates that upgraded banks reduce their provisions, a 
strategy which may be the outcome of a more prudent credit expansion policy, or, equally 
plausible, of a less conservative and more optimistic management of risk. As before, lagged 
changes and values of loss allowance, profitability and size are significant in explaining the 
variation of the dependent variable. 
Lastly, the only other dependent variable for which CRDUM is significant at the 1% level, 
with a positive sign, is the change in net income to total assets, DDX7. This result suggests that 
upgraded banks are becoming more profitable than their pairs. In the present analysis, we do not 
examine where this increased profitability stems for but leave this for future research. The 
changes from t-2 to t of loss allowance, DDX2lag1, trading assets, DDX3lag1, and fixed assets, 
DDX5lag1, are also significant with mixed signs, indicating that changes in banks’ asset 
composition affect its profitability in a rather complicated way. The lagged changes and the value 
at t-1 of net income also play their role, as indicated by the significance of DDX7lag1, DX7 and 
X7lag1, coupled with the values at t-1 of loss allowance, X2lag1, liquidity, X6lag1, and size, 
X10lag1. 
 Table 5 confirms the above results. Indeed, for the change in net loans to total assets the 
intercept is positive and significant at the 10% level, while the model explains 39.9% of the 
variation of the dependent variable. As for net income, the intercept is again positive and 
significant, but now at the 10% level, with adjusted R2 equal to 0.389. The same is not true, 
however, for the change in loss allowance.  
Insert Table 5 here 
 
Downgraded Banks – One Year Horizon. 
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For the sample of downgraded banks, the results of Table 6 indicate that when the change in loss 
allowance, DDX2, is employed as the dependent variable, CRDUM is significant with a positive 
sign. Thus, a downward revision of a bank’s credit rating seems to act as a disciplinary 
mechanism that forces bank managers to reduce their loan portfolio risk. Alternatively, it could 
also be the outcome of asset quality deterioration caused by the downgrading. Specifically, a 
downgraded bank faces increased borrowing costs and/or deteriorated reputation which serves as 
an incentive for the banks to take more risks in lending. The relatively large number of the other 
explanatory variables that are significant for this model suggests that for the increase in loss 
allowance for downgraded banks, their asset composition, profitability, leverage and size are 
taken into account.  
Insert Table 6 here 
CRDUM is also significant and positive for the change in other real estate owned, DDX4,. As 
previously mentioned, this variable measures real estate taken in settlement of problem loans plus 
real estate investments, other than bank premises. As such, this finding indicates that downgraded 
banks make an effort to cleanse their portfolio from bad loans. The results of the OLS approach 
for this sample, reported in Table 7, are in full accordance with the above. Only the intercepts for 
DDX2 and DDX4 are significant and positive.   
Insert Table 7 here 
 
Two Years Horizon. 
Turning to the two years horizon after the rating change, the results of the Heckman’s two-step 
estimation method and the OLS approach for the sample of upgraded banks are summarized in 
Tables 8 and 9. As both tables document, upgraded banks continue to have increased profitability 
relatively to their pairs over a two years horizon after the rating change, since CRDUM and the 
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intercept for the two models, respectively, are significant with positive sign. The same holds for 
the change in log assets. Upgraded banks are increasing in size. 
Insert Tables 8 and 9 here 
As far as downgraded banks, Tables 10 and 11 report that several financial accounts increases are 
in order after the downgrade. In the loss allowance equation, DDX2, the coefficients for both the 
CRDUM variable in equation (1) and the intercept in equation (3) are positive and significant. In 
the liquidity equation, DDX6, the coefficients for the CRDUM variable and the intercept are also 
significant. This is possibly the result of a more precautionary policy of the downgraded bank in 
terms of liquidity, rather than a change in its lending activity, as suggested by the non-significant 
results for the total loans equation, DDX1. This could be achieved either through higher cash 
balances and/or higher level of investment securities held in bank’s portfolio which points to a 
change in bank’s asset management. Certainly, a more detailed analysis is needed, which, 
however, is beyond the scope of this paper, to investigate which forces drive the increased 
liquidity position of downgraded banks. In the leverage and size equations, DDX9 and DDX10, 
respectively, the relevant coefficients are positive and significant as well. The statistical 
significance of the respective coefficients for these variables, as well as for liquidity, DDX6, is 
lower in the Heckman’s Two-step Estimation Method than in the OLS approach. However, this 
should be attributed to the less precise estimate of the instrumental variable approach. The latter 
findings are surprising, since both increased leverage and size point to a more risky institution. 
Rationally, a downgrade should lead to the opposite result. A possible explanation is that in the 
long run a downgrade provides incentives to banks to take higher risks in an effort to improve 
their rating quality. To put it differently, it seems that a downgrade disciplines banks only in the 
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short term. As for net income, DDX7, only the intercept in equation (3) is positive and significant, 
while the CRDUM in equation (1) is insignificant.   
Insert Tables 10 and 11 here 
 
 
6. Conclusions and Policy Implications. 
 
This study examines credit ratings’ impact on banks. Specifically, the study investigates the 
impact of upgrades and downgrades on six comprehensive banks’ asset classes, profitability, 
leverage and size in one and two years’ horizon after the rating change. The results indicate that in 
the one year horizon after a rating change an upgrade results in an increase in net loans and 
profitability. This finding probably reflects a decrease in the price of wholesale funding, combined 
with increased loan market shares for these banks. A downgrade, however, results in an increase 
in loss allowance and other real estate owned, providing evidence for an effort of downgraded 
banks to reduce their loan portfolio risk and cleanse bad loans. 
Turning to the two-year horizon after a rating change, upgraded banks continue to exhibit 
higher profitability and increase in size. The latter is evidence of an increase in risk-taking 
behavior (Flannery and Nikolova, 2004). Downgraded banks continue to increase their loss 
provisions, while they improve their liquidity position. Surprisingly though, there is evidence for 
an increase in their leverage and size, possibly as an outcome of these banks’ effort to improve 
their rating quality, however in a more risky way. In summary, the findings suggest that a 
downgrade has a lasting and relatively more severe impact on banks than an upgrade; yet, 
downgraded banks seem to not effectively reduce their appetite for risk in a longer horizon.  
 The above evidence corroborates that credit ratings do serve as corporate governance 
devices and impact banks’ asset and liability management. To put it differently, credit ratings have 
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real economic decision-making consequences for banks, as Kisgen (2006) and Tang (2009) argue 
when examining non-financial firms. It seems, however, that the role of credit rating agencies as 
an integral part of banks’ prudential supervision through market discipline is, in a longer horizon, 
overstated. This paper’s findings point to increased supervisors’ responsibility for deterring banks’ 
risk taking behavior – especially for downgraded banks – and evaluating its performance towards 
the goal of a sound financial system. The optimal mix between rating agencies and supervisory 
authorities’ roles in the context of an improved regulation and supervision scheme remains an 
open question. 
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Table 1. Financial Account Variables’ Definition 
Symbol Definition 
X1 
(Total loans and leases, gross –Allowance plus excess allowance for loan and lease losses + 
Customers' liabilities on outstanding acceptances) / Total assets 
X2 Allowance plus excess allowance for loan and lease losses / Total assets 
X3 Trading assets, total / Total assets 
X4 Other real estate owned / Total assets 
X5 
(Book value of bank premises and fixed assets + Investments in unconsolidated subsidiaries + 
Intangible assets + Other assets) / Total assets 
X6 
(Cash and balances due + Total investment securities + Interbank balances + Federal funds sold and 
securities purchased under agreement to resell) / Total Assets 
X7 Net income / Total assets 
X8 Total non interest income / Total assets 
X9 Total liabilities / Book value of equity 
X10 Log (Total assets) 
   
Source: Call reports and authors’ calculations 
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Table 2. Credit Rating Distribution and Sample Characteristics 
Panel A. Credit Rating 
 1987-1990 1991-1994 1995-1998 1999-2002 2003-2006 2007-2009 Total 
AAA  0 / 0 2 / 0 8 / 0 2 / 0 0 / 0 6 / 3 18 / 3 
AA+  13 / 13 3 / 3 5 / 3 4 / 0 7 / 2 25 / 14 57 / 35 
AA  41 / 37 39 / 32 40 / 27 18 / 9 35 / 20 36 / 15 209 / 140 
AA-  56 / 34 67 / 51 208 / 152 198 / 132 141 / 75 88 / 44 758 / 488 
A+  51 / 44 124 / 97 202 / 145 235 / 153 190 / 120 80 / 44 882 / 603 
A  59 / 43 125 / 91 192 / 141 140 / 104 94 / 77 84 / 64 694 / 520 
A-  64 / 54 104 / 85 121 / 96 103 / 82 95 / 69 76 / 47 563 / 433 
BBB+  15 / 13 37 / 31 60 / 51 77 / 74 98 / 92 59 / 50 346 / 311 
BBB  13 / 12 32 / 27 49 / 34 84 / 64 78 / 64 36 / 35 292 / 236 
BBB-  10 / 10 17 / 12 14 / 9 38 / 19 31 / 15 10 / 6 120 / 71 
BB+  2 / 2 8 / 7 19 / 8 10 / 5 5 / 2 1 / 0 45 / 24 
BB  1 / 1 2 / 1 3 / 1 6 / 2 6 / 2 1 / 1 19 / 8 
BB-  1 / 0 1 / 1 0 / 0 3 / 2 2 / 2 3 / 2 10 / 7 
B+  0 / 0 0 / 0 1 / 0 4 / 3 6 / 3 0 / 0 11 / 6 
B  1 / 1 2 / 1 2 / 0 0 / 0 0 / 0 0 / 0 5 / 2 
B-  0 / 0 0 / 0 1 / 0 3 / 2 0 / 0 1 / 1 5 / 3 
CCC+ 0 / 0 0 / 0 0 / 0 4 / 3 2 / 2 0 / 0 6 / 5 
D 0 / 0 0 / 0 0 / 0 1 / 0 0 / 0 2 / 0 3 / 0 
Total 327 / 264 563 / 439 925 / 667 930 / 654 790 / 545 508 / 326 4,043 / 2,895 
Panel B. Upgrades and Downgrades 
 1989-1990 1991-1994 1995-1998 1999-2002 2003-2006 2007-2008 Total 
Upgrades 7 / 5 64 / 36 57 / 19 42 / 23 92 / 50 56 / 25 318 / 158 
Downgrades 34 / 19 35 / 25 46 / 27 48 / 20 16 / 12 63 / 28 242 / 131 
Total Changes 41 / 24 99 / 61 103 / 46 90 / 43 108 / 62 119 / 53 560 / 289 
No change 117 398 719 789 657 210 2,890 
Panel C. Changes in Notches 
 1989-1990 1991-1994 1995-1998 1999-2002 2003-2006 2007-2008 Total 
[-12,-5] 1 / 0 1 / 0 1 / 0 1 / 0 1 / 0 1 / 0 6 / 0 
-4 0 / 0 1 / 0 0 / 0 2 / 1 1 / 0 0 / 0 4 / 1 
-3 1 / 0 1 / 1 0 / 0 5 / 3 3 / 0 4 / 0 14 / 4 
-2 1 / 1 3 / 2 4 / 1 9 / 5 6 / 2 4 / 1 27 / 12 
-1 4 / 4 58 / 33 52 / 18 25 / 14 81 / 48 47 / 24 267 / 141 
1 20 / 13 23 / 19 41 / 26 39 / 18 14 / 11 37 / 18 174 / 105 
2 7 / 2 7 / 3 4 / 0 5 / 2 1 / 0 22 / 8 46 / 15 
3 3 / 2 4 / 3 0 / 0 1 / 0 0 / 0 3 / 2 11 / 7 
4 2 / 2 0 / 0 1 / 1 0 / 0 1 / 1 0 / 0 4 / 4 
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[5,8] 2 / 0 1 / 0 0 / 0 3 / 0 0 / 0 1 / 0 7 / 0 
Total Changes 41 / 24 99 / 61 103 / 46 90 / 43 108 / 62 119 / 53 560 / 289 
No change 117 398 719 789 657 210 2,890 
 
Notes:  
  1. Source: Bloomberg and authors’ calculations.  
  2. The S&P long term issuer rating is used.  
  3. In Panel A, each cell reports the number of observations in the initial credit rating sample obtained from Bloomberg and the number of observations for the 
merged sample with data from the call reports after the slash.  
  4. In Panels B and C each cell reports the number of credit rating changes in the initial credit rating sample obtained from Bloomberg and the relevant number 
of observations in the final working dataset after the slash. 
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics – Financial Account Variables’ Changes 
 Upgraded Banks Downgraded Banks Difference 
Variable Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean t-stat 
DDX1 0.001 0.092 -0.027 0.101 0.028*** 2.46 
DDX2 2E-4 0.009 0.007 0.016 -0.007*** -4.31 
DDX3 0.004 0.042 -0.003 0.029 0.007* 1.74 
DDX4 -0.001 0.003 4.3E-4 0.005 -0.001** -2.22 
DDX5 0.005 0.026 -0.001 0.025 0.006** 1.90 
DDX6 -0.010 0.096 0.015 0.095 -0.025** -2.16 
DDX7 -0.001 0.009 -0.002 0.013 0.001 0.45 
DDX8 -0.002 0.019 -0.001 0.031 -0.001 -0.42 
DDX9 -0.799 2.644 -1.047 2.435 0.248 0.82 
DDX10 0.104 0.129 0.037 0.114 0.067*** 4.67 
DX1 -0.001 0.056 -0.010 0.072 0.009 1.23 
DX2 -0.001 0.003 0.004 0.010 -0.005*** -5.90 
DX3 0.003 0.023 -0.003 0.019 0.006*** 2.45 
DX4 -4.2E-4 0.002 2.4E-4 0.003 -0.001*** -2.43 
DX5 0.003 0.021 -0.001 0.022 0.004** 1.92 
DX6 -0.007 0.051 0.010 0.082 -0.017** -2.15 
DX7 -0.001 0.006 -0.003 0.009 0.002** 2.28 
DX8 -0.002 0.012 -0.004 0.028 0.002 0.70 
DX9 -0.610 2.183 -0.577 1.891 -0.033 -0.13 
DX10 0.053 0.077 0.019 0.072 0.034*** 3.87 
Notes:  
1. Source: Call reports and authors’ calculations.  
2. Variables definition: 
X1: (Total loans and leases, gross –Allowance plus excess allowance for loan and lease losses + Customers' liabilities on 
outstanding acceptances) / Total assets 
X2: Allowance plus excess allowance for loan and lease losses / Total assets 
X3: Trading assets, total / Total assets 
X4: Other real estate owned / Total assets 
X5: (Book value of bank premises and fixed assets + Investments in unconsolidated subsidiaries + Intangible assets + Other 
assets) / Total assets 
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X6: (Cash and balances due + Total investment securities + Interbank balances + Federal funds sold and securities purchased 
under agreement to resell) / Total Assets 
X7: Net income / Total assets 
X8: Total non interest income / Total assets 
X9: Total liabilities / Book value of equity 
X10: Log (Total assets) 
3. DDXi: Change in variable Xi between t-1 and t+1.  
4. DXi: Change in variable Xi between t-1 and t.  
5. One (*), two (**) and three (***) asterisks denote significance at respectively the 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
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Table 4. Upgraded Banks – One Year Horizon – Heckman’s Two-step Estimation Method  
 DDX1 DDX2 DDX3 DDX4 DDX5 DDX6 DDX7 DDX8 DDX9 DDX10 
C 0.119***    (0.029) 
-0.008***    
(0.003) 
0.0001     
(0.003) 
0.0004***   
(0.0001) 
-0.013*    
(0.007) 
0.016     
(0.01) 
0.011***    
(0.004) 
0.025***    
(0.008) 
1.789***    
(0.391) 
0.029     
(0.041) 
CRDUM 0.016*    (0.009) 
-0.003***    
(0.001) 
0.004     
(0.005) 
-0.0001     
(0.0002) 
-0.004     
(0.003) 
-0.006     
(0.010) 
0.004***    
(0.001) 
-0.001     
(0.003) 
-0.019     
(0.275) 
0.006     
(0.015) 
DDX1lag1 
0.003     
(0.097) 
0.002     
(0.006) 
-0.06     
(0.038) 
0.0003     
(0.001) 
0.016     
(0.018) 
-0.365***    
(0.077) 
-0.004     
(0.007) 
-0.028     
(0.019) 
0.102     
(1.984) 
0.250***   
(0.099) 
DDX2lag1 
0.110     
(0.457) 
-0.205***    
(0.072) 
-0.532*    
(0.287) 
-0.008     
(0.011) 
-0.075     
(0.139) 
0.793     
(0.588) 
0.181***    
(0.056) 
0.072     
(0.145) 
6.885     
(15.188) 
2.410***   
(0.751) 
DDX3lag1 
-0.089     
(0.086) 
0.01     
(0.008) 
-0.736***   
(0.113) 
-0.0001     
(0.002) 
0.014     
(0.025) 
0.326***    
(0.112) 
-0.028***    
(0.010) 
-0.044     
(0.027) 
-0.068     
(2.920) 
0.117     
(0.141) 
DDX4lag1 
-0.601     
(0.888) 
0.117     
(0.083) 
1.017*    
(0.546) 
0.030     
(0.038) 
0.679***   
(0.253) 
-1.458     
(1.128) 
0.023     
(0.102) 
-0.267     
(0.279) 
-58.017**    
(29.537) 
-1.526     
(1.454) 
DDX5lag1 
-0.005     
(0.147) 
-0.004     
(0.013) 
0.251***    
(0.087) 
-0.005*    
(0.003) 
0.043     
(0.058) 
-0.594***    
(0.179) 
-0.044***    
(0.016) 
-0.050     
(0.043) 
8.628*    
(4.658) 
0.099     
(0.227) 
DDX6lag1 
-0.063     
(0.079) 
0.002     
(0.006) 
-0.02     
(0.037) 
-0.001     
(0.001) 
-0.016     
(0.020) 
-0.151     
(0.096) 
-0.002     
(0.008) 
-0.012     
(0.018) 
4.642**    
(1.992) 
0.239***   
(0.096) 
DDX7lag1 
0.711     
(0.454) 
-0.143***    
(0.045) 
0.725***    
(0.280) 
-0.016     
(0.01) 
0.284**    
(0.137) 
-1.421***    
(0.565) 
-0.143**    
(0.073) 
-0.332**    
(0.143) 
35.339**    
(14.741) 
-0.011     
(0.728) 
DDX8lag1 
-0.221     
(0.239) 
-0.009     
(0.024) 
-0.114     
(0.143) 
0.012***    
(0.005) 
-0.055     
(0.074) 
0.514*    
(0.300) 
0.035     
(0.028) 
0.087     
(0.089) 
3.110     
(7.462) 
-0.063     
(0.367) 
DDX9lag1 
0.001     
(0.001) 
0.0001     
(0.0001) 
0.0004     
(0.0008) 
0.0002     
(0.00003) 
0.0004     
(0.0004) 
-0.003     
(0.002) 
-0.0001     
(0.0002) 
-0.0003     
(0.0004) 
0.046     
(0.061) 
0.0008     
(0.002) 
DDX10lag1 
-0.052*    
(0.028) 
-0.0001     
(0.0025) 
0.003     
(0.017) 
0.0003     
(0.001) 
0.004     
(0.008) 
0.125***    
(0.034) 
-0.001     
(0.003) 
0.009     
(0.008) 
-0.514     
(0.867) 
0.147***   
(0.057) 
DXi,  
i=1,..,10 
0.838***    
(0.104) 
1.330***    
(0.158) 
1.514***    
(0.178) 
0.841***    
(0.098)  
0.791***    
(0.116) 
0.767***    
(0.098) 
1.068***    
(0.130) 
0.664***    
(0.082) 
1.046***   
(0.090) 
Xilag1  
i=1,..,10 
-0.072***   
(0.025) 
0.003     
(0.035) 
-0.032     
(0.032) 
-0.271***   
(0.036)  
-0.137***    
(0.033) 
-0.314***    
(0.045) 
-0.004     
(0.036) 
-0.185***    
(0.031) 
-0.003     
(0.006) 
X2lag1        
0.217***    
(0.042)    
X5lag1 
-0.170*    
(0.090)         
0.523***   
(0.145) 
X6lag1       
0.010***    
(0.003)    
X7lag1  
0.093***    
(0.032)         
X10lag1 -0.009**    0.001***      0.003***    -0.002***    -0.003***      
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(0.004) (0.0003) (0.001) (0.0007) (0.001) 
Obs. 308 310 316 304 300 316 306 316 316 316 
Wald stat. 391.940 [0.000] 
321.470 
[0.000] 
151.970 
[0.000] 
675.080 
[0.000] 
280.180 
[0.000] 
323.200 
[0.000] 
446.530 
[0.000] 
257.240 
[0.000] 
405.780 
[0.000] 
453.790 
[0.000] 
Pseudo-R2 0.331 0.307 0.329 0.314 0.310 0.326 0.325 0.321 0.324 0.321 
LR stat. 141.330 [0.000] 
132.010 
[0.000] 
144.090 
[0.000] 
132.240 
[0.000] 
129.070 
[0.000] 
142.940 
[0.000] 
138.000 
[0.000] 
140.800 
[0.000] 
142.050 
[0.000] 
140.800 
[0.000] 
Notes:  
1. Sample period: 1989-2008. 
2. Variables definition: 
X1: (Total loans and leases, gross –Allowance plus excess allowance for loan and lease losses + Customers' liabilities on outstanding acceptances) / 
Total assets 
X2: Allowance plus excess allowance for loan and lease losses / Total assets 
X3: Trading assets, total / Total assets 
X4: Other real estate owned / Total assets 
X5: (Book value of bank premises and fixed assets + Investments in unconsolidated subsidiaries + Intangible assets + Other assets) / Total assets 
X6: (Cash and balances due + Total investment securities + Interbank balances + Federal funds sold and securities purchased under agreement to 
resell) / Total Assets 
X7: Net income / Total assets 
X8: Total non interest income / Total assets 
X9: Total liabilities / Book value of equity 
X10: Log (Total assets) 
3. DDXi: Change in variable Xi between t-1 and t+1. 
4. CRDUM: Dummy variable that takes the values of 1 and 0 for the ‘treated’ and control banks, respectively.  
5. DDXilag1: Change in variable Xi between t-2 and t. 
6. DXi: Change in variable Xi between t-1 and t. 
7. Xilag1:  Value of variable Xi at t-1. 
8. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. p-values are reported in brackets. 
9. One (*), two (**) and three (***) asterisks denote significance at respectively the 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
10. The last two rows report statistics from the firs stage probit regression model for CRDUM. 
11. Sources: Call reports, Bloomberg and authors’ calculations.  
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Table 5. Upgraded Banks – One Year Horizon – OLS Approach 
 DDX1 DDX2 DDX3 DDX4 DDX5 DDX6 DDX7 DDX8 DDX9 DDX10 
C 0.052*    (0.027) 
-0.001     
(0.001) 
0.001     
(0.004) 
0.0002     
(0.0001) 
0.003     
(0.003) 
0.008     
(0.014) 
0.002*    
(0.001) 
-0.0002    
(0.003) 
-1.411     
(1.129) 
-0.033     
(0.079) 
CNTRLDDXi 
i=1,..,10 
0.034     
(0.112) 
0.520***   
(0.142) 
0.046     
(0.222) 
0.117     
(0.076) 
0.388**    
(0.175) 
0.129     
(0.107) 
0.096     
(0.062) 
0.035     
(0.061) 
0.215     
(0.132) 
-0.214*    
(0.117) 
DDX1lag1 
0.068     
(0.175) 
0.008     
(0.007) 
-0.064     
(0.059) 
0.002     
(0.002) 
-0.008     
(0.042) 
-0.427**    
(0.201) 
0.003     
(0.011) 
-0.033     
(0.032) 
-2.977     
(2.728) 
0.278     
(0.212) 
DDX2lag1 
0.603     
(0.696) 
-0.201*    
(0.120) 
-0.718     
(0.460) 
-0.008     
(0.019) 
-1.287***    
(0.494) 
0.777     
(1.094) 
0.041     
(0.110) 
-0.033     
(0.343) 
52.378**    
(25.554) 
2.871*    
(1.533) 
DDX3lag1 
-0.062     
(0.151) 
-0.006     
(0.005) 
-0.748***   
(0.277) 
-0.002     
(0.002) 
-0.065*    
(0.037) 
0.288**    
(0.131) 
-0.026     
(0.020) 
-0.060*    
(0.033) 
-0.59     
(3.696) 
0.148     
(0.108) 
DDX4lag1 
-0.573     
(1.226) 
0.079     
(0.091) 
1.139*    
(0.632) 
-0.117**    
(0.051) 
0.268     
(0.581) 
-2.011     
(1.429) 
-0.215*    
(0.119) 
-0.333     
(0.465) 
-180.261***   
(44.267) 
-0.613     
(1.747) 
DDX5lag1 
-0.050     
(0.232) 
0.028     
(0.025) 
0.272     
(0.174) 
-0.012*    
(0.007) 
-0.14     
(0.088) 
-0.666***   
(0.257) 
-0.039     
(0.027) 
-0.049     
(0.077) 
-1.839     
(6.234) 
0.083     
(0.422) 
DDX6lag1 
-0.043     
(0.179) 
0.0003    
(0.008) 
-0.013     
(0.050) 
0.001     
(0.002) 
-0.109**    
(0.056) 
-0.202     
(0.234) 
0.002     
(0.014) 
-0.023     
(0.038) 
2.943     
(2.449) 
0.290     
(0.193) 
DDX7lag1 
0.567     
(0.657) 
-0.191**   
(0.082) 
1.224*    
(0.679) 
-0.014     
(0.027) 
-0.200     
(0.303) 
-1.398     
(1.767) 
-0.144     
(0.132) 
-0.214     
(0.352) 
46.297     
(30.220) 
-0.143     
(1.800) 
DDX8lag1 
-0.154     
(0.293) 
0.005     
(0.042) 
-0.154     
(0.160) 
0.020*    
(0.011) 
0.255     
(0.239) 
0.468     
(0.469) 
0.006     
(0.056) 
0.062     
(0.134) 
16.978     
(14.184) 
-0.068     
(0.686) 
DDX9lag1 
0.002     
(0.002) 
0.0002     
(0.0002) 
-0.0001     
(0.0024) 
0.00004     
(0.00004) 
0.002*    
(0.001) 
-0.003     
(0.002) 
-0.0002    
(0.0002) 
-0.0002    
(0.0003) 
0.015     
(0.086) 
0.0004     
(0.0031) 
DDX10lag1 
-0.081     
(0.055) 
0.002     
(0.002) 
0.020     
(0.028) 
0.002**    
(0.001) 
0.008     
(0.016) 
0.142**    
(0.068) 
-0.004     
(0.004) 
0.005     
(0.009) 
-1.375     
(1.216) 
0.164     
(0.133) 
DXi,  
i=1,..,10 
0.781***    
(0.181) 
1.128***   
(0.256) 
1.469***   
(0.410) 
1.182***    
(0.117) 
0.988***    
(0.105) 
0.819***    
(0.241) 
0.690***   
(0.180) 
1.033***   
(0.198) 
0.650***    
(0.122) 
1.031***    
(0.173) 
Xilag1  
i=1,..,10 
-0.059     
(0.037) 
-0.029     
(0.08) 
-0.035     
(0.129) 
-0.228***    
(0.09) 
-0.062     
(0.047) 
-0.123**    
(0.055) 
-0.153*    
(0.087) 
-0.015     
(0.074) 
-0.133***    
(0.045) 
0.013     
(0.011) 
X1lag1          
4.678***    
(1.553)  
X7lag1  
0.136***   
(0.050)         
DX4         
292.493***    
(102.076)  
DX7  
0.261**    
(0.112)         
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Obs 154 155 158 152 150 158 153 158 158 158 
Adj-R2 0.399 0.480 0.262 0.844 0.367 0.421 0.389 0.489 0.604 0.510 
Notes:  
1. Sample period: 1989-2008.  
2. Variables definition: 
X1: (Total loans and leases, gross –Allowance plus excess allowance for loan and lease losses + Customers' liabilities on outstanding acceptances) / Total 
assets 
X2: Allowance plus excess allowance for loan and lease losses / Total assets 
X3: Trading assets, total / Total assets 
X4: Other real estate owned / Total assets 
X5: (Book value of bank premises and fixed assets + Investments in unconsolidated subsidiaries + Intangible assets + Other assets) / Total assets 
X6: (Cash and balances due + Total investment securities + Interbank balances + Federal funds sold and securities purchased under agreement to resell) / 
Total Assets 
X7: Net income / Total assets 
X8: Total non interest income / Total assets 
X9: Total liabilities / Book value of equity 
X10: Log (Total assets) 
3. DDXi: Change in variable Xi between t-11 and t+1 for the ‘treated’ banks. 
4. CNTRLDDXi: Change in variable Xi between t-1 and t+1 for the control banks. 
5. DDXilag1: Change in variable Xi between t-2 and t for the ‘treated’ banks. 
6. DXi: Change in variable Xi between t-1 and t for the ‘treated’ banks. 
7. Xilag1: Value of variable Xi at t-1 for the ‘treated’ banks.. 
8. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
9. One (*), two (**) and three (***) asterisks denote significance at respectively the 10%, 5% and 1% level.  
10. Sources: Call reports, Bloomberg and authors’ calculations.  
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Table 6. Downgraded Banks – One Year Horizon – Heckman’s Two-step Estimation Method 
 DDX1 DDX2 DDX3 DDX4 DDX5 DDX6 DDX7 DDX8 DDX9 DDX10 
C 0.133***    (0.045) 
-0.0003     
(0.001) 
0.002     
(0.003) 
0.008***    
(0.002) 
-0.019**    
(0.008) 
0.036**    
(0.015) 
-0.002     
(0.002) 
0.001     
(0.001) 
0.452     
(0.436) 
0.083**    
(0.037) 
CRDUM 0.023     (0.016) 
0.004**    
(0.002) 
-0.002     
(0.005) 
0.002**    
(0.001) 
-0.002     
(0.004) 
-0.025     
(0.018) 
0.003     
(0.002) 
0.003     
(0.002) 
-0.279     
(0.480) 
-0.028     
(0.018) 
DDX1lag1 
0.055     
(0.061) 
-0.007     
(0.006) 
0.027*    
(0.015) 
-0.0002     
(0.002) 
0.005     
(0.012) 
-0.113*    
(0.06) 
0.012     
(0.008) 
0.009     
(0.006) 
-0.513     
(1.508) 
0.142***   
(0.058) 
DDX2lag1 
-1.202***   
(0.452) 
-0.256**    
(0.109) 
-0.005     
(0.120) 
-0.062***    
(0.020) 
0.307***    
(0.102) 
0.782     
(0.508) 
-0.206***  
(0.062) 
-0.062     
(0.057) 
-32.245***   
(12.434) 
-0.822*    
(0.441) 
DDX3lag1 
0.102     
(0.148) 
-0.033**    
(0.016) 
0.214***    
(0.048) 
-0.001     
(0.006) 
0.017     
(0.032) 
-0.014     
(0.226) 
0.030     
(0.020) 
0.005     
(0.016) 
-2.103     
(3.944) 
0.008     
(0.152) 
DDX4lag1 
0.169     
(0.988) 
0.139     
(0.128) 
-0.372     
(0.267) 
-0.220***    
(0.059) 
0.017     
(0.221) 
-0.355     
(1.092) 
0.060     
(0.137) 
0.014     
(0.111) 
15.459     
(27.178) 
-1.930**   
(0.980) 
DDX5lag1 
-0.089     
(0.224) 
0.074***   
(0.028) 
0.099     
(0.063) 
-0.017*    
(0.010) 
0.037     
(0.057) 
-0.460*    
(0.245) 
-0.017     
(0.031) 
0.037     
(0.027) 
-6.478     
(6.153) 
-0.264     
(0.250) 
DDX6lag1 
-0.076     
(0.075) 
-0.017**    
(0.008) 
0.089***    
(0.018) 
-0.006*    
(0.003) 
-0.001     
(0.015) 
0.040     
(0.102) 
0.007     
(0.009) 
0.010     
(0.007) 
-3.367*    
(1.786) 
0.095     
(0.068) 
DDX7lag1 
0.544     
(0.578) 
-0.192***   
(0.074) 
-0.152     
(0.158) 
-0.079***    
(0.025) 
0.358***    
(0.142) 
-0.934     
(0.626) 
-0.340***  
(0.119) 
-0.249***    
(0.069) 
-10.800     
(15.545) 
-0.219     
(0.585) 
DDX8lag1 
-0.139     
(0.204) 
-0.067***   
(0.024) 
-0.094*    
(0.057) 
0.015*    
(0.009) 
0.038     
(0.091) 
-0.102     
(0.224) 
0.114***   
(0.030) 
0.111     
(0.070) 
-0.815     
(5.553) 
0.090     
(0.219) 
DDX9lag1 
0.005**    
(0.002) 
-0.001***   
(0.0003) 
0.0002     
(0.0006) 
0.0001     
(0.0001) 
0.002***    
(0.0005) 
-0.004     
(0.002) 
-0.0006*    
(0.0003) 
0.0004     
(0.0003) 
-0.178**    
(0.078) 
0.002     
(0.002) 
DDX10lag1 
-0.037     
(0.04) 
0.017***   
(0.004) 
0.004     
(0.010) 
-0.001     
(0.002) 
0.006     
(0.008) 
0.048     
(0.041) 
-0.003     
(0.005) 
-0.001     
(0.004) 
2.129**    
(1.006) 
-0.016     
(0.053) 
DXi,  
i=1,..,10 
0.728***    
(0.103) 
1.273***   
(0.129) 
0.585***    
(0.098) 
1.274***    
(0.093) 
0.686***    
(0.088) 
0.475***    
(0.115) 
0.982***   
(0.124) 
0.706***    
(0.092) 
0.832***    
(0.090) 
1.060***   
(0.099) 
Xilag1  
i=1,..,10 
-0.083***   
(0.032) 
-0.178***   
(0.066) 
-0.117***    
(0.016) 
-0.268***    
(0.049) 
-0.118***   
(0.036) 
-0.106***   
(0.044) 
-0.133*    
(0.078) 
-0.056     
(0.034) 
-0.082***    
(0.033) 
-0.005     
(0.005) 
X2lag1       
0.108*    
(0.062)    
X6lag1    
-0.007***    
(0.002)       
X10lag1 
-0.014***   
(0.005)   
-0.0009***   
(0.0002) 
0.004***    
(0.001)      
Obs. 254 246 262 262 254 256 262 248 262 254 
Wald stat. 238.430 [0.000] 
528.910 
[0.000] 
388.800 
[0.000] 
430.300 
[0.000] 
185.070 
[0.000] 
157.840 
[0.000] 
291.520 
[0.000] 
292.380 
[0.000] 
283.510 
[0.000] 
434.230 
[0.000] 
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Pseudo-R2 0.251 0.259 0.256 0.249 0.253 0.280 0.249 0.323 0.258 0.276 
LR stat. 88.450 [0.000] 
88.460 
[0.000] 
93.090 
[0.000] 
90.420 
[0.000] 
88.990 
[0.000] 
99.280 
[0.000] 
90.310 
[0.000] 
110.940 
[0.000] 
93.580 
[0.000] 
97.120 
[0.000] 
Notes:  
1. Sample period: 1989-2008. 
2. Variables definition: 
X1: (Total loans and leases, gross –Allowance plus excess allowance for loan and lease losses + Customers' liabilities on outstanding acceptances) / 
Total assets 
X2: Allowance plus excess allowance for loan and lease losses / Total assets 
X3: Trading assets, total / Total assets 
X4: Other real estate owned / Total assets 
X5: (Book value of bank premises and fixed assets + Investments in unconsolidated subsidiaries + Intangible assets + Other assets) / Total assets 
X6: (Cash and balances due + Total investment securities + Interbank balances + Federal funds sold and securities purchased under agreement to resell) / 
Total Assets 
X7: Net income / Total assets 
X8: Total non interest income / Total assets 
X9: Total liabilities / Book value of equity 
X10: Log (Total assets) 
3. DDXi: Change in variable Xi between t-1 and t+1. 
4. CRDUM: Dummy variable that takes the values of 1 and 0 for the ‘treated’ and control banks, respectively.  
5. DDXilag1: Change in variable Xi between t-2 and t. 
6. DXi: Change in variable Xi between t-1 and t. 
7. Xilag1:  Value of variable Xi at t-1. 
8. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. p-values are reported in brackets. 
9. One (*), two (**) and three (***) asterisks denote significance at respectively the 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
10. The last two rows report statistics from the firs stage probit regression model for CRDUM. 
11. Sources: Call reports, Bloomberg and authors’ calculations.  
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Table 7. Downgraded Banks – One Year Horizon – OLS Approach 
 DDX1 DDX2 DDX3 DDX4 DDX5 DDX6 DDX7 DDX8 DDX9 DDX10 
C 0.044     (0.029) 
0.003**    
(0.001) 
-0.001     
(0.002) 
0.001**    
(0.0003) 
0.005     
(0.003) 
0.025     
(0.0167) 
0.0001     
(0.001) 
-0.002     
(0.001) 
0.140     
(0.988) 
0.039     
(0.068) 
CNTRLDDXi 
i=1,..,10 
0.248*    
(0.144) 
0.227***    
(0.084) 
0.041     
(0.109) 
0.626***    
(0.194) 
-0.201*    
(0.118) 
0.117     
(0.113) 
0.609***    
(0.239) 
0.102     
(0.204) 
-0.014     
(0.136) 
0.195*    
(0.105) 
DDX1lag1 
-0.148     
(0.171) 
-0.011*    
(0.007) 
0.039     
(0.034) 
0.002     
(0.002) 
0.017     
(0.011) 
-0.162**   
(0.068) 
0.019*    
(0.011) 
0.011*    
(0.006) 
-1.210     
(2.306) 
0.123     
(0.106) 
DDX2lag1 
-0.790     
(0.497) 
-0.108     
(0.161) 
0.053     
(0.141) 
-0.035*    
(0.021) 
0.392**    
(0.182) 
0.322     
(0.533) 
-0.134     
(0.109) 
-0.099     
(0.114) 
-34.656    
(20.948) 
-0.737*    
(0.433) 
DDX3lag1 
-0.169     
(0.269) 
-0.061***    
(0.016) 
0.271***    
(0.106) 
0.003     
(0.004) 
0.024     
(0.074) 
-0.278     
(0.467) 
0.019     
(0.021) 
-0.017     
(0.018) 
-0.649     
(5.935) 
0.073     
(0.266) 
DDX4lag1 
-1.093     
(1.192) 
0.079     
(0.149) 
-0.658**    
(0.334) 
-0.381***    
(0.119) 
0.093     
(0.282) 
0.557     
(1.251) 
-0.207     
(0.253) 
-0.251     
(0.153) 
13.149     
(40.508) 
-0.186     
(1.341) 
DDX5lag1 
-0.053     
(0.356) 
0.025     
(0.032) 
0.091     
(0.073) 
-0.012     
(0.018) 
-0.033     
(0.082) 
-0.378     
(0.322) 
-0.030     
(0.045) 
0.077     
(0.051) 
-2.913     
(7.777) 
0.045     
(0.382) 
DDX6lag1 
-0.083     
(0.094) 
-0.020**    
(0.009) 
0.134**    
(0.068) 
0.002     
(0.003) 
0.001     
(0.017) 
-0.069     
(0.108) 
0.019     
(0.012) 
0.014     
(0.016) 
-2.994     
(2.347) 
0.052     
(0.115) 
DDX7lag1 
0.222     
(0.848) 
-0.129     
(0.130) 
-0.376     
(0.25) 
-0.024     
(0.028) 
0.426**    
(0.182) 
-0.123     
(0.730) 
-0.627***   
(0.209) 
-0.432***    
(0.137) 
-9.744     
(16.507) 
-0.586     
(0.612) 
DDX8lag1 
-0.131     
(0.249) 
-0.024     
(0.027) 
-0.094*    
(0.053) 
0.005     
(0.012) 
0.066     
(0.081) 
-0.178     
(0.246) 
0.086***    
(0.030) 
0.173     
(0.172) 
-5.401     
(5.078) 
-0.196     
(0.227) 
DDX9lag1 
0.003     
(0.003) 
-0.001***    
(0.0004) 
0.0002     
(0.0009) 
0.0002     
(0.0001) 
0.002**    
(0.0007) 
-0.005     
(0.004) 
-0.001     
(0.001) 
0.0003     
(0.0004) 
-0.180*    
(0.097) 
-0.005     
(0.005) 
DDX10lag1 
-0.059     
(0.057) 
0.010*    
(0.006) 
0.006     
(0.014) 
-0.003*    
(0.002) 
-0.005     
(0.010) 
0.104*    
(0.056) 
-0.004     
(0.007) 
0.006     
(0.007) 
2.642**    
(1.245) 
-0.028     
(0.061) 
DXi,  
i=1,..,10 
1.000***    
(0.196) 
0.974***    
(0.236) 
0.581**    
(0.273) 
1.141***    
(0.223) 
0.862***    
(0.122) 
0.377**    
(0.182) 
1.012***    
(0.227) 
0.734***    
(0.198) 
0.799***   
(0.181) 
1.409***   
(0.125) 
Xilag1  
i=1,..,10 
-0.077*    
(0.043) 
-0.297***    
(0.102) 
-0.110***    
(0.04) 
-0.172*    
(0.098) 
-0.030     
(0.068) 
-0.116**   
(0.056) 
-0.038     
(0.102) 
0.109*    
(0.062) 
-0.067     
(0.092) 
-0.006     
(0.010) 
Obs. 127 123 131 131 127 128 131 124 131 127 
Adj-R2 0.418 0.698 0.631 0.584 0.423 0.247 0.557 0.452 0.413 0.557 
Notes:  
1. Sample period: 1989-2008.  
2. Variables definition: 
X1: (Total loans and leases, gross –Allowance plus excess allowance for loan and lease losses + Customers' liabilities on outstanding acceptances) / Total 
assets 
X2: Allowance plus excess allowance for loan and lease losses / Total assets 
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X3: Trading assets, total / Total assets 
X4: Other real estate owned / Total assets 
X5: (Book value of bank premises and fixed assets + Investments in unconsolidated subsidiaries + Intangible assets + Other assets) / Total assets 
X6: (Cash and balances due + Total investment securities + Interbank balances + Federal funds sold and securities purchased under agreement to resell) / 
Total Assets 
X7: Net income / Total assets 
X8: Total non interest income / Total assets 
X9: Total liabilities / Book value of equity 
X10: Log (Total assets) 
3. DDXi: Change in variable Xi between t-1 and t+1 for the ‘treated’ banks. 
4. CNTRLDDXi: Change in variable Xi between t+1 and t-1 for the control banks. 
5. DDXilag1: Change in variable Xi between t-2 and t for the ‘treated’ banks. 
6. DXi: Change in variable Xi between t-1 and t for the ‘treated’ banks.  
7. Xilag1: Value of variable Xi at t-1 for the ‘treated’ banks.. 
8. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
9. One (*), two (**) and three (***) asterisks denote significance at respectively the 10%, 5% and 1% level.  
10. Sources: Call reports, Bloomberg and authors’ calculations.  
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Table 8. Upgraded Banks  – Two Years Horizon – Heckman’s Two-step Estimation Method 
 DDX1av2 DDX2av2 DDX3av2 DDX4av2 DDX5av2 DDX6av2 DDX7av2 DDX8av2 DDX9av2 DDX10av2 
C -0.002     (0.003) 
-0.00002     
(0.0005) 
-0.003**    
(0.001) 
0.00004     
(0.0001) 
0.002*    
(0.001) 
0.004     
(0.004) 
0.003***    
(0.001) 
0.003***    
(0.001) 
0.173     
(0.198) 
0.013**    
(0.006) 
CRDUM -0.001     (0.004) 
-0.001     
(0.0005) 
0.002     
(0.002) 
-0.0002     
(0.0001) 
0.0003     
(0.002) 
-0.004     
(0.004) 
0.001*    
(0.001) 
0.0003     
(0.001) 
-0.066     
(0.143) 
0.030***    
(0.009) 
DDX1av2lag1 
0.133*    
(0.076) 
0.001     
(0.005) 
-0.017     
(0.021) 
-0.001     
(0.001) 
0.001     
(0.019) 
-0.167***   
(0.045) 
0.010*    
(0.006) 
0.010*    
(0.006) 
1.880     
(1.397) 
-0.106     
(0.085) 
DDX2av2lag1 
0.313     
(0.415) 
-0.908***    
(0.224) 
0.079     
(0.215) 
0.033**    
(0.014) 
-0.282     
(0.191) 
0.577     
(0.432) 
0.070     
(0.058) 
-0.157***    
(0.057) 
19.588     
(15.386) 
1.038     
(0.881) 
DDX3av2lag1 
0.033     
(0.063) 
0.015**    
(0.007) 
-0.151**    
(0.074) 
-0.001     
(0.002) 
-0.051*    
(0.029) 
-0.022     
(0.066) 
-0.001     
(0.009) 
0.002     
(0.008) 
4.375**    
(2.077) 
-0.233*    
(0.135) 
DDX4av2lag1 
-0.799     
(0.773) 
0.499***    
(0.118) 
0.537     
(0.404) 
-0.021     
(0.130) 
-0.171     
(0.362) 
0.359     
(0.799) 
-0.177     
(0.109) 
0.178*    
(0.107) 
-13.008     
(26.627) 
-0.518     
(1.663) 
DDX5av2lag1 
0.101     
(0.096) 
-0.036***    
(0.013) 
-0.065     
(0.050) 
-0.008**    
(0.003) 
-0.007     
(0.110) 
-0.225**    
(0.107) 
-0.011     
(0.014) 
-0.007     
(0.014) 
8.197***    
(3.264) 
-0.041     
(0.206) 
DDX6av2lag1 
0.044     
(0.042) 
-0.007     
(0.005) 
-0.005     
(0.022) 
-0.003**    
(0.001) 
0.001     
(0.019) 
-0.108     
(0.092) 
0.015***    
(0.006) 
0.011*    
(0.006) 
-1.115     
(1.411) 
-0.064     
(0.089) 
DDX7av2lag1 
0.470     
(0.314) 
0.052     
(0.05) 
0.308*    
(0.164) 
0.0001     
(0.011) 
-0.588***   
(0.148) 
0.291     
(0.379) 
-0.319***   
(0.092) 
-0.215***    
(0.048) 
44.423***   
(11.411) 
2.421***    
(0.683) 
DDX8av2lag1 
-0.120     
(0.129) 
-0.057***    
(0.018) 
0.048     
(0.067) 
0.006     
(0.004) 
0.176***   
(0.060) 
-0.222     
(0.151) 
-0.026     
(0.019) 
-0.084     
(0.084) 
-10.495**    
(4.536) 
-0.022     
(0.277) 
DDX9av2lag1 
-0.0008     
(0.0008) 
-0.0002     
(0.0001) 
-0.002***   
(0.0004) 
0.00006**   
(0.00003) 
-0.001*    
(0.0004) 
0.0002     
(0.001) 
0.0001     
(0.0001) 
0.0002     
(0.0001) 
-0.017     
(0.077) 
0.003**    
(0.002) 
DDX10av2lag1 
0.008     
(0.017) 
0.001     
(0.002) 
0.031***   
(0.009) 
0.002***    
(0.001) 
-0.009     
(0.008) 
0.026     
(0.018) 
0.003     
(0.002) 
-0.0002     
(0.002) 
1.375**    
(0.578) 
0.070     
(0.120) 
DDXi,  
i=1,..,10 
0.932***    
(0.053) 
1.562***    
(0.173) 
1.138***    
(0.046) 
1.072***    
(0.109) 
0.866***   
(0.082) 
0.913***    
(0.071) 
1.009***    
(0.081) 
1.131***    
(0.070) 
0.950***    
(0.062) 
0.953***    
(0.092) 
X2lag1         
-19.562***   
(5.735)  
X3lag1       
-0.007*    
(0.004) 
-0.01***    
(0.004)   
X6lag1         
-1.708***    
(0.484)  
X7lag1  
0.052**    
(0.025)    
-0.497**    
(0.214) 
-0.306***   
(0.03) 
-0.252***    
(0.03) 
19.978***   
(6.705)  
Obs. 252 248 252 252 252 244 252 244 252 252 
Wald stat. 3559.830 442.950 3161.130 3139.070 1004.510 1337.660 1483.570 2086.050 2481.110 1617.780 
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[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Pseudo-R2 0.305 0.305 0.303 0.306 0.304 0.311 0.361 0.331 0.303 0.304 
LR stat. 106.470 [0.000] 
99.830 
[0.000] 
105.960 
[0.000] 
106.980 
[0.000] 
106.240 
[0.000] 
105.210 
[0.000] 
126.170 
[0.000] 
111.890 
[0.000] 
105.880 
[0.000] 
106.030 
[0.000] 
Notes:  
1. Sample period: 1989-2007. 
2. Variables definition: 
X1: (Total loans and leases, gross –Allowance plus excess allowance for loan and lease losses + Customers' liabilities on outstanding acceptances) / Total 
assets 
X2: Allowance plus excess allowance for loan and lease losses / Total assets 
X3: Trading assets, total / Total assets 
X4: Other real estate owned / Total assets 
X5: (Book value of bank premises and fixed assets + Investments in unconsolidated subsidiaries + Intangible assets + Other assets) / Total assets 
X6: (Cash and balances due + Total investment securities + Interbank balances + Federal funds sold and securities purchased under agreement to resell) / 
Total Assets 
X7: Net income / Total assets 
X8: Total non interest income / Total assets 
X9: Total liabilities / Book value of equity 
X10: Log (Total assets) 
3. DDXiav2: Change in variable Xi between t-1 and its average value for the t+1 to t+2 period. 
4. CRDUM: Dummy variable that takes the values of 1 and 0 for the ‘treated’ and control banks, respectively.  
5. DDXiav2lag1: Change in variable Xi between t-2 and its average value for the t to t+1 period. 
6. DDXi: Change in variable Xi between t-11 and t+1. 
7. Xilag1:  Value of variable Xi at t-1. 
8. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. p-values are reported in brackets. 
9. One (*), two (**) and three (***) asterisks denote significance at respectively the 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
10. The last two rows report statistics from the firs stage probit regression model for CRDUM. 
11. Sources: Call reports, Bloomberg and authors’ calculations.  
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Table 9. Upgraded Banks – Two Years Horizon – OLS Approach 
 DDX1av2 DDX2av2 DDX3av2 DDX4av2 DDX5av2 DDX6av2 DDX7av2 DDX8av2 DDX9av2 DDX10av2 
C -0.005     (0.004) 
0.0001     
(0.0004) 
-0.002     
(0.0025) 
-0.0001     
(0.0001) 
0.002     
(0.001) 
0.006     
(0.006) 
0.001*     
(0.001) 
0.002     
(0.001) 
-0.158     
(0.118) 
0.037***    
(0.010) 
CNTRLDDXiav2  
i =1,..,10 
0.032     
(0.080) 
0.56***    
(0.145) 
0.033     
(0.139) 
0.238***    
(0.077) 
0.095     
(0.09) 
0.059     
(0.062) 
0.103*    
(0.06) 
-0.035     
(0.046) 
0.089     
(0.068) 
-0.038     
(0.069) 
DDX1av2lag1 
0.144     
(0.107) 
0.017**    
(0.008) 
-0.022     
(0.044) 
-0.0002     
(0.002) 
0.011     
(0.027) 
-0.197**    
(0.086) 
0.011     
(0.007) 
0.006     
(0.007) 
2.838     
(2.002) 
-0.062     
(0.105) 
DDX2av2lag1 
0.501     
(0.693) 
-0.589*    
(0.306) 
0.148     
(0.328) 
0.036**    
(0.019) 
-0.333     
(0.274) 
-0.023     
(0.623) 
-0.031     
(0.093) 
-0.171     
(0.103) 
59.066***   
(17.776) 
0.730     
(0.998) 
DDX3av2lag1 
0.063     
(0.103) 
0.004     
(0.007) 
-0.145     
(0.190) 
-0.003     
(0.002) 
-0.065***   
(0.02) 
-0.011     
(0.156) 
-0.006     
(0.01) 
-0.004     
(0.007) 
3.27*    
(1.756) 
-0.261**    
(0.112) 
DDX4av2lag1 
-0.272     
(0.911) 
-0.002     
(0.232) 
0.644     
(0.568) 
-0.043     
(0.334) 
-0.422     
(0.448) 
-0.373     
(0.905) 
-0.392***   
(0.159) 
0.065     
(0.168) 
11.981     
(30.094) 
-3.172*    
(1.901) 
DDX5av2lag1 
0.067     
(0.142) 
-0.037     
(0.022) 
-0.084     
(0.078) 
-0.009**    
(0.004) 
0.019     
(0.151) 
-0.159     
(0.169) 
0.012     
(0.016) 
0.011     
(0.023) 
5.554     
(4.397) 
0.124     
(0.248) 
DDX6av2lag1 
0.084*    
(0.049) 
0.004     
(0.006) 
-0.014     
(0.038) 
-0.002     
(0.003) 
0.008     
(0.026) 
-0.089     
(0.113) 
0.009     
(0.006) 
0.009     
(0.007) 
0.111     
(1.616) 
-0.057     
(0.115) 
DDX7av2lag1 
0.445     
(0.606) 
-0.089     
(0.097) 
0.476     
(0.410) 
0.007     
(0.024) 
-0.587     
(0.362) 
0.895*    
(0.479) 
-0.261     
(0.159) 
-0.123     
(0.109) 
28.559     
(18.083) 
-0.119     
(1.121) 
DDX8av2lag1 
-0.154     
(0.184) 
-0.023     
(0.025) 
0.032     
(0.057) 
0.007     
(0.009) 
0.192*    
(0.101) 
-0.027     
(0.143) 
-0.005     
(0.021) 
0.066     
(0.190) 
-10.368***   
(3.737) 
-0.090     
(0.201) 
DDX9av2lag1 
-0.001     
(0.001) 
-0.0001    
(0.0001) 
-0.003     
(0.003) 
0.00005     
(0.0001) 
-0.001     
(0.001) 
-0.0002     
(0.0013) 
0.0001     
(0.0001) 
0.0002     
(0.0002) 
-0.029     
(0.121) 
0.004     
(0.002) 
DDX10av2lag1 
0.004     
(0.026) 
0.006     
(0.004) 
0.032     
(0.028) 
0.003**    
(0.001) 
0.00002     
(0.012) 
0.039**    
(0.019) 
0.005**    
(0.002) 
0.001     
(0.003) 
2.134***    
(0.624) 
0.145     
(0.175) 
DDXi,  
i=1,..,10 
0.947***    
(0.070) 
1.283***   
(0.201) 
1.148***   
(0.126) 
0.979***    
(0.300) 
0.823***    
(0.129) 
0.804***    
(0.092) 
0.887***   
(0.107) 
1.050***   
(0.175) 
0.978***    
(0.098) 
0.893***    
(0.146) 
X3lag1       
-0.006*    
(0.003) 
-0.009**   
(0.004)   
X6lag1      
-0.055**    
(0.024)     
X7lag1       
-0.186***   
(0.054) 
-0.125*    
(0.068)   
Obs. 126 124 126 126 126 122 126 122 126 126 
Adj-R2 0.939 0.710 0.924 0.924 0.792 0.849 0.882 0.878 0.899 0.881 
Notes:  
1. Sample period: 1989-2007. 
2. Variables definition: 
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X1: (Total loans and leases, gross –Allowance plus excess allowance for loan and lease losses + Customers' liabilities on outstanding acceptances) / Total 
assets 
X2: Allowance plus excess allowance for loan and lease losses / Total assets 
X3: Trading assets, total / Total assets 
X4: Other real estate owned / Total assets 
X5: (Book value of bank premises and fixed assets + Investments in unconsolidated subsidiaries + Intangible assets + Other assets) / Total assets 
X6: (Cash and balances due + Total investment securities + Interbank balances + Federal funds sold and securities purchased under agreement to resell) / 
Total Assets 
X7: Net income / Total assets 
X8: Total non interest income / Total assets 
X9: Total liabilities / Book value of equity 
X10: Log (Total assets) 
3. DDXiav2: Change in variable Xi between t-1 and its average value for the t+1 to t+2 period for the ‘treated’ banks. 
4. CNTRLDDXiav2: Change in variable Xi between t-1 and its average value for the t+1 to t+2 period for the control banks.  
5. DDXiav2lag1: Change in variable Xi between t-2 its average value for the t to t+1 period for the ‘treated’ banks.. 
6. DDXi: Change in variable Xi between t-1 and t+1 for the ‘treated’ banks.. 
7. Xilag1:  Value of variable Xi at t-1 for the ‘treated’ banks. 
8. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
9. One (*), two (**) and three (***) asterisks denote significance at respectively the 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
10. Sources: Call reports, Bloomberg and authors’ calculations.  
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Table 10. Downgraded Banks  – Two Years Horizon – Heckman’s Two-step Estimation Method 
 DDX1av2 DDX2av2 DDX3av2 DDX4av2 DDX5av2 DDX6av2 DDX7av2 DDX8av2 DDX9av2 DDX10av2 
C -0.001     (0.004) 
-0.002***   
(0.001) 
0.001     
(0.001) 
0.0003**    
(0.0001) 
0.002     
(0.001) 
0.013*    
(0.008) 
0.001**    
(0.001) 
-0.00004   
(0.0006) 
2.213***    
(0.295) 
0.0004     
(0.010) 
CRDUM -0.010     (0.006) 
0.001***    
(0.0004) 
-0.001     
(0.002) 
-0.0001     
(0.0002) 
-0.003     
(0.002) 
0.012*    
(0.007) 
0.0003     
(0.0005) 
0.0003     
(0.0009) 
0.389*    
(0.216) 
0.016*    
(0.010) 
DDX1av2lag1 
-0.010     
(0.082) 
0.003     
(0.003) 
0.055***    
(0.013) 
0.003**    
(0.001) 
0.034***   
(0.012) 
0.133***   
(0.045) 
0.009***    
(0.003) 
0.016***   
(0.007) 
0.844     
(1.309) 
-0.155**    
(0.068) 
DDX2av2lag1 
-1.545***   
(0.356) 
-0.132*    
(0.076) 
0.096     
(0.101) 
0.001     
(0.012) 
0.258***   
(0.100) 
0.505     
(0.367) 
0.145***    
(0.033) 
-0.084     
(0.057) 
-26.344***   
(10.260) 
-1.144*    
(0.607) 
DDX3av2lag1 
-0.231*    
(0.128) 
0.0001     
(0.008) 
0.731***    
(0.129) 
-0.0001     
(0.004) 
-0.023     
(0.036) 
0.239*    
(0.135) 
0.01     
(0.01) 
0.012     
(0.018) 
-4.057     
(4.110) 
0.039     
(0.212) 
DDX4av2lag1 
-0.145     
(0.615) 
0.020     
(0.040) 
0.195     
(0.169) 
-0.133**    
(0.065) 
0.140     
(0.172) 
0.679     
(0.634) 
0.107**    
(0.046) 
0.297***   
(0.089) 
-8.006     
(19.042) 
-1.519     
(0.991) 
DDX5av2lag1 
-0.400***   
(0.144) 
0.001     
(0.010) 
0.083**    
(0.04) 
0.005     
(0.005) 
-0.236*    
(0.137) 
0.383***   
(0.150) 
-0.004     
(0.012) 
0.043**    
(0.022) 
10.716**    
(4.683) 
-0.707***    
(0.233) 
DDX6av2lag1 
-0.046     
(0.041) 
0.001     
(0.003) 
0.057***    
(0.012) 
0.003**    
(0.001) 
0.033***   
(0.012) 
0.096     
(0.086) 
0.004     
(0.003) 
0.010*    
(0.006) 
-0.445     
(1.273) 
-0.068     
(0.066) 
DDX7av2lag1 
-1.161***   
(0.432) 
-0.047     
(0.031) 
0.277**    
(0.119) 
-0.013     
(0.015) 
-0.010     
(0.121) 
1.074**    
(0.446) 
0.211***    
(0.078) 
-0.145**   
(0.065) 
4.245     
(13.449) 
1.253     
(0.826) 
DDX8av2lag1 
1.016***    
(0.252) 
0.042***    
(0.017) 
-0.178***    
(0.070) 
-0.003     
(0.008) 
0.160**    
(0.070) 
-0.669***   
(0.265) 
0.028     
(0.026) 
0.264**    
(0.130) 
-6.917     
(7.272) 
0.349     
(0.408) 
DDX9av2lag1 
-0.002     
(0.001) 
0.0001     
(0.0001) 
-0.0001     
(0.0004) 
0.0001**    
(0.00005) 
-0.0005    
(0.0004) 
0.005***   
(0.002) 
-0.0001     
(0.0001) 
-0.0001    
(0.0002) 
-0.289***    
(0.116) 
-0.003     
(0.002) 
DDX10av2lag1 
0.077***    
(0.028) 
0.001     
(0.002) 
-0.002     
(0.008) 
-0.001     
(0.001) 
0.002     
(0.008) 
-0.108***   
(0.029) 
0.005*    
(0.003) 
0.006     
(0.004) 
-0.158     
(0.838) 
-0.359***    
(0.145) 
DDXi,  
i=1,..,10 
0.851***    
(0.062) 
0.942***    
(0.061) 
0.283***    
(0.102) 
0.892***    
(0.052) 
0.998***   
(0.108) 
0.914***   
(0.063) 
0.648***    
(0.058) 
0.660***   
(0.098) 
1.104***    
(0.098) 
1.327***    
(0.113) 
Xilag1  
i=1,..,10  
0.006***    
(0.001) 
-0.089***    
(0.008) 
-0.176***   
(0.017)  
-0.047**    
(0.022) 
-0.136***    
(0.027) 
 -0.171***    (0.020)  
X2lag1  
-0.162***   
(0.016)       
-16.98***    
(6.16)  
X5lag1         
-6.243***    
(2.206)  
X7lag1          
1.039**    
(0.488) 
Obs. 188 182 188 188 188 184 184 182 182 182 
Wald stat. 1660.120 [0.000] 
2801.560 
[0.000] 
2221.900 
[0.000] 
4546.470 
[0.000] 
1015.800 
[0.000] 
1786.460 
[0.000] 
1141.920 
[0.000] 
656.680 
[0.000] 
1371.270 
[0.000] 
1471.410 
[0.000] 
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Pseudo-R2 0.327 0.422 0.333 0.339 0.374 0.345 0.461 0.343 0.319 0.374 
LR stat. 85.280 [0.000] 
106.580 
[0.000] 
86.840 
[0.000] 
88.260 
[0.000] 
97.570 
[0.000] 
87.950 
[0.000] 
107.360 
[0.000] 
86.640 
[0.000] 
80.580 
[0.000] 
94.280 
[0.000] 
Notes:  
1. Sample period: 1989-2007. 
2. Variables definition: 
X1: (Total loans and leases, gross –Allowance plus excess allowance for loan and lease losses + Customers' liabilities on outstanding acceptances) / Total 
assets 
X2: Allowance plus excess allowance for loan and lease losses / Total assets 
X3: Trading assets, total / Total assets 
X4: Other real estate owned / Total assets 
X5: (Book value of bank premises and fixed assets + Investments in unconsolidated subsidiaries + Intangible assets + Other assets) / Total assets 
X6: (Cash and balances due + Total investment securities + Interbank balances + Federal funds sold and securities purchased under agreement to resell) / 
Total Assets 
X7: Net income / Total assets 
X8: Total non interest income / Total assets 
X9: Total liabilities / Book value of equity 
X10: Log (Total assets) 
3. DDXiav2: Change in variable Xi between t-1 and its average value for the t+1 to t+2 period for the ‘treated’ banks. 
4. CRDUM: Dummy variable that takes the values of 1 and 0 for the ‘treated’ and control banks, respectively.  
5. DDXiav2lag1: Change in variable Xi between t-2 and its average value for the t to t+1 period for the ‘treated’ banks. 
6. DDXi: Change in variable Xi between t-1 and t+1 for the ‘treated’ banks. 
7. Xilag1:  Value of variable Xi at t-1 for the ‘treated’ banks. 
8. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. p-values are reported in brackets. 
9. One (*), two (**) and three (***) asterisks denote significance at respectively the 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
10. The last two rows report statistics from the firs stage probit regression model for CRDUM. 
11. Sources: Call reports, Bloomberg and authors’ calculations.  
  
 
 
 
 
 48
 
Table 11. Downgraded Banks  – Two Years Horizon – OLS Approach 
 DDX1av2 DDX2av2 DDX3av2 DDX4av2 DDX5av2 DDX6av2 DDX7av2 DDX8av2 DDX9av2 DDX10av2 
C  0.004     (0.004) 
0.001***   
(0.0004) 
0.0004     
(0.0007) 
-0.0002     
(0.0002) 
-0.001     
(0.001) 
0.005*    
(0.003) 
0.002***   
(0.001) 
0.0004     
(0.0004) 
1.963***    
(0.400) 
0.021***    
(0.006) 
CNTRLDDXiav2  
i =1,..,10 
0.006***    
(0.002) 
-0.026     
(0.078) 
0.006     
(0.095) 
-0.027     
(0.120) 
0.198**    
(0.091) 
-0.026     
(0.045) 
0.042     
(0.054) 
-0.018     
(0.075) 
0.073     
(0.069) 
-0.003     
(0.003) 
DDX1av2lag1 
0.297***    
(0.072) 
-0.0001     
(0.004) 
0.059***    
(0.015) 
-0.0006     
(0.003) 
0.058***    
(0.020) 
0.207     
(0.139) 
0.007     
(0.005) 
0.022***    
(0.007) 
2.329     
(1.875) 
-0.215**    
(0.099) 
DDX2av2lag1 
-0.885     
(0.699) 
-0.071     
(0.183) 
0.143     
(0.147) 
-0.022     
(0.029) 
0.197     
(0.196) 
0.561     
(0.463) 
0.067     
(0.080) 
0.065     
(0.069) 
-26.645     
(19.82) 
-1.541     
(1.342) 
DDX3av2lag1 
-0.273     
(0.248) 
0.011     
(0.011) 
0.704     
(0.455) 
0.004     
(0.007) 
-0.007     
(0.049) 
0.362     
(0.271) 
-0.005     
(0.018) 
-0.019     
(0.020) 
-23.686***   
(9.369) 
-0.139     
(0.299) 
DDX4av2lag1 
-1.971     
(1.711) 
0.007     
(0.090) 
0.445     
(0.279) 
-0.522**    
(0.253) 
0.331     
(0.220) 
1.315*    
(0.715) 
0.142     
(0.091) 
0.322**    
(0.137) 
21.915     
(30.408) 
-2.651     
(1.823) 
DDX5av2lag1 
-0.316     
(0.275) 
0.022     
(0.021) 
0.100**    
(0.051) 
0.006     
(0.013) 
-0.037     
(0.262) 
0.652***    
(0.241) 
0.070**    
(0.034) 
-0.009     
(0.074) 
23.895***   
(7.815) 
-0.939     
(0.635) 
DDX6av2lag1 
-0.117**    
(0.050) 
-0.002     
(0.004) 
0.057***    
(0.014) 
-0.001     
(0.003) 
0.060***    
(0.023) 
0.427*    
(0.219) 
-0.001     
(0.005) 
0.013***    
(0.005) 
0.750     
(1.836) 
-0.114     
(0.091) 
DDX7av2lag1 
-1.359**    
(0.683) 
-0.061     
(0.049) 
0.457     
(0.302) 
-0.046     
(0.036) 
0.061     
(0.188) 
1.060*    
(0.595) 
0.094     
(0.171) 
-0.048     
(0.104) 
13.544     
(21.546) 
-0.369     
(1.177) 
DDX8av2lag1 
0.890*    
(0.475) 
0.040     
(0.030) 
-0.231**    
(0.117) 
0.004     
(0.017) 
0.166     
(0.120) 
-0.795**    
(0.401) 
-0.011     
(0.075) 
0.838***    
(0.171) 
-7.112     
(15.125) 
0.848     
(0.614) 
DDX9av2lag1 
-0.002     
(0.002) 
-0.00005    
(0.0001) 
-0.0003     
(0.0009) 
-0.00006     
(0.0002) 
-0.0003     
(0.001) 
0.004*    
(0.002) 
-0.00004    
(0.0002) 
0.0002     
(0.0003) 
-0.234     
(0.228) 
-0.003     
(0.004) 
DDX10av2lag1 
0.070**    
(0.030) 
0.005     
(0.003) 
-0.004     
(0.010) 
0.0003     
(0.002) 
-0.005     
(0.009) 
-0.132***   
(0.035) 
-0.001     
(0.003) 
0.007     
(0.005) 
0.077     
(1.463) 
-0.442**    
(0.219) 
DDXi,  
i=1,..,10 
0.606***    
(0.083) 
0.935***   
(0.131) 
0.218     
(0.403) 
1.274***    
(0.142) 
0.803***    
(0.221) 
0.820***    
(0.118) 
0.763***   
(0.125) 
0.226*    
(0.118) 
1.095***    
(0.222) 
1.416***    
(0.194) 
X2lag1  
-0.103***   
(0.024)         
X3lag1   
-0.098***   
(0.016)        
X7lag1       
-0.159***   
(0.046)    
X9lag1         
-0.167***    
(0.034)  
Obs. 94 91 94 94 94 92 92 91 91 91 
Adj-R2 0.871 0.942 0.919 0.890 0.810 0.898 0.856 0.825 0.851 0.851 
Notes:  
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1. Sample period: 1989-2007. 
2. Variables definition: 
X1: (Total loans and leases, gross –Allowance plus excess allowance for loan and lease losses + Customers' liabilities on outstanding acceptances) / Total 
assets 
X2: Allowance plus excess allowance for loan and lease losses / Total assets 
X3: Trading assets, total / Total assets 
X4: Other real estate owned / Total assets 
X5: (Book value of bank premises and fixed assets + Investments in unconsolidated subsidiaries + Intangible assets + Other assets) / Total assets 
X6: (Cash and balances due + Total investment securities + Interbank balances + Federal funds sold and securities purchased under agreement to resell) / 
Total Assets 
X7: Net income / Total assets 
X8: Total non interest income / Total assets 
X9: Total liabilities / Book value of equity 
X10: Log (Total assets) 
3. DDXiav2: Change in variable Xi between t-1 and its average value for the t+1 to t+2 period for the ‘treated’ banks. 
4. CNTRLDDXiav2: Change in variable Xi between t-1 and its average value for the t+1 to t+2 period for the control banks.  
5. DDXiav2lag1: Change in variable Xi between t-2 and its average value for the t to t+1 period for the ‘treated’ banks. 
6. DDXi: Change in variable Xi between t-1 and t+1 for the ‘treated’ banks. 
7. Xilag1:  Value of variable Xi at t-1 for the ‘treated’ banks. 
8. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
9. One (*), two (**) and three (***) asterisks denote significance at respectively the 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
10. Sources: Call reports, Bloomberg and authors’ calculations.  
 
 
 
